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A “Neo-Abolitionist Trend” in Sub-Saharan
Africa? Regional Anti-Trafficking Patterns and a
Preliminary Legislative Taxonomy
Benjamin N. Lawrance and Ruby P Andrew
INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the US Department of State (USDOS) instituted the
production of its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, antitrafficking measures have been passed across the globe, and the US role in
setting standards and paradigms for anti-trafficking has been extensively
analyzed and criticized.1 Through its Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons (OMCTP), the USDOS’ three-tier categorization of
nations’ trafficking measures continues to play a pivotal role in shaming
recalcitrant nations into responding to accusations of trafficking within and
across their respective borders.2
No region has experienced so dramatic a transformation with respect to
the USDOS agenda of “prevention, protection, and prosecution” than subSaharan Africa.3 No sub-Saharan African nation had an anti-trafficking
statute at the start of the millennium. Over the course of the decade, the
USDOS annually updated data on legislative responses and upbraided
individual nations. By 2010, the supermajority of African nations had
enacted new legislation to respond to the growing concern with trafficking
in persons.4 Yet comparatively little research has examined the regional
dimensions of this new legislative experiment and the shape it is taking.
Although some reports present data regionally—what we shall later
describe as part of a “horizontal” framework—scant research has attempted
to assess the effectiveness of anti-trafficking legislation in developing
nations on a regional basis.5 More commonly, data is presented nation-bynation, and analysis is generally restricted to the domestic context.6
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While it is possible to demonstrate a relationship between a perceived
increase in trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa and subsequent regional
legislative responses, establishing causality between USDOS TIP directives
and new laws is more complex. No language in the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA) and its subsequent
reauthorizations addresses regional variations. To the contrary, the 2003
reauthorization reframed data collection efforts to showcase “global,” rather
than regional, trends.7 There are those who insist the transformative vision
embedded in new legislation is anchored by one or several domestic or
international diplomatic agendas.8 Our interests here, however, reside less in
identifying the policy mechanics and ideological progenitors of laws, and
more in predicting the effectiveness and stability of the legislative paradigm
as a remedy, as part of the wider debate on the nature of slavery and
abolition in Africa. The precise origins of the evolving taxonomy we
describe below remain a matter of significant debate. Thus, in order to
predict the relative success of the implementation of the region’s new laws,
we propose to contextualize them by situating them among earlier
abolitionist activities affecting sub-Saharan Africa.
For over two centuries antislavery efforts (i.e., outlawing the legal slave
trade) and anti-trafficking strategies (i.e., combating illegal slave trading)
have been developed in and outside of Africa through the use of legislative
mechanisms. Scholars, however, can point to numerous examples of
African states where multiple laws over many decades have failed to
extinguish slavery and slavery-related practices. Focusing on specific
nations (Mauritania, for example) only further underscores this apparent
contradiction. On the one hand, the sequential nature of legislative remedy
reveals how ineffective legislation may be subjected to revision and reform.
On the other hand, practitioners of slavery and slavery-like practices seem
able to circumvent each successive legislative remedy. This ability to
circumvent new laws highlights slavery practitioners’ “reinventive”
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capacity—insofar as systems of labor coercion morph into new systems of
exploitation to evade regulation and prohibition.9
We see the centrality of colonial and national boundaries and
jurisdictions to studies of abolitionist activity, insofar as evidence and
analysis is compiled nationally and presented chronologically, as an
obstructive factor in predicting legislative efficacy.10 We describe this
method of presentation and analysis as a “vertical” approach. Vertical
studies ignore the “horizontal,” i.e. regional or continental-wide, processes
associated with legislative remedies as they fan out across space and time.
One solution is to recast the dimensions of study, and to examine legislative
programs regionally and transnationally. We contend that what appears to
be a new regional trend is more accurately interpreted as only the most
recent iteration of a long-standing tradition of broad-based action that we
identify as a “legislative trend.”11
While our goal is to examine the broad contours of legislative action, and
such contours are more easily identifiable after considerable time has
elapsed since the enactment of laws, we acknowledge that each individual
law is produced discretely and domestically. Furthermore, a focus on broad
contours also allows us to distinguish between domestic legal products from
bilateral, multilateral, and regional treaties and conventions, and
memoranda pertaining to anti-trafficking. The laws that interest us are
national products, and we have not found evidence that individual nations
are collaborating on specific domestic legislative apparatuses. Moreover, as
our preliminary taxonomy demonstrates, there is considerable disagreement
among African nations with respect to how to respond to the perceived
increased in trafficking.12
We are writing with a set of underlying assumptions and/or observations
that we will detail here to provide the context necessary to understand our
argument. First, a substantial corpus of antislavery/anti-trafficking
legislation exists, from which we identify several distinct historical trends.
Second, we observe that previous abolitionist activities struggled with
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defining slave systems and slave trades, much as many contemporary
efforts have struggled to define trafficking. Third, antislavery and antitrafficking laws in sub-Saharan Africa from the precolonial period all the
way into the postcolonial period created multiple categories of victims and
perpetrators. Fourth, laws, treaties, and conventions—the antecedents of the
contemporary neo-abolitionist agenda—created separate categories for
adults and children and also distinguished between men and women.13 Fifth,
subsequent antislavery and anti-trafficking laws attempted to plug the gaps
in colonial and postcolonial legislative apparatuses and curtail the
“reinventive” capacity of systems of labor coercion.
We identify six general characteristics of a legislative trend and based on
our identification of these characteristics, we hypothesize that sub-Saharan
Africa is currently in the grip of what we term a neo-abolitionist trend. We
argue that previous trends of antislavery and anti-trafficking legislation
enacted over and implemented in sub-Saharan Africa provide important
guidance in predicting the future with respect to regional anti-trafficking
initiatives and the future of the contemporary neo-abolitionist agenda.
Moreover, the resistance of certain sub-Saharan African nations (such as
Niger and Botswana) to pass, implement, and enforce new legislation
speaks to the long history of resistance by Africans to legal change
emanating from abroad.14
In the context of this discussion, we offer a description and interpretation
of the emerging trends in sub-Saharan African anti-trafficking legislation.
We examine the forms and content of the laws using examples from a broad
spectrum of countries, and we propose a preliminary taxonomy based on the
countries’ deployment of international models for the criminalization of
trafficking in persons. We argue that three forms of legislative response to
trafficking appear to be underway in sub-Saharan Africa: the first is a broad
or “blanket” human trafficking model; the second consists of a “childcentric” legislative model; and the third model comprises countries which
enhance or “revalidate” existing domestic legislation and criminal codes.
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The first group comprises states deploying laws on human trafficking
interpreted in the broadest sense, which generically appear to meet evolving
international minimum standards. The second group comprises states where
laws prohibit only trafficking of minors, although the laws may accompany
differing prohibitions depending on the relationship between trafficker and
trafficked. The third group comprises states that appear to be resisting the
current vogue for new law. They respond in a variety of ways, including
amending criminal codes and labor laws, with the inference that current
domestic legislative apparatuses provide sufficient protections for victims
and scope for the prosecution of perpetrators.15
In summary, Part One of this article provides a synopsis of the traditional
“vertical” narrative of slavery and abolition in Mauritania to demonstrate
how the “horizontal” approach we propose (i.e., a transnational and regional
perspective) is more valuable than the vertical approach. In Part Two, we
identify what we call the “abolitionist legislative trend.” We use this section
to explain that we identified this trend by exploring anteceding legislative
trends of antislavery and anti-trafficking legislation as it pertains to subSaharan Africa. We also explain the defining characteristics of individual
trends. Part Three summarizes the general characteristics of the legislative
trend and then describes the contours of the current “neo-abolitionist” trend.
We then examine the forms of contemporary anti-trafficking legislation
unfolding in sub-Saharan Africa and outline a new taxonomy of state-based
responses by focusing on domestic legislative outcomes. Based on the
antecedent legislative trends and on the contemporary “neo-abolitionist
legislative trend,” Part Four includes a series of predictions about antitrafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, and a proposal for a test hypothesis. Part
Five offers some suggestions for more effective solutions to the problems
presented in this article.
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I. A “VERTICAL” PERSPECTIVE ON SLAVERY AND ABOLITION
Mauritania is often highlighted in press reports as a country with a deep
and ingrained history of slavery and slave trading.16 The apparent
attachment to slavery and slave-like institutions of the inhabitants of the
country known today as the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is something of
a conundrum to international humanitarians and national legislators alike.17
Explanations of the seemingly stubborn resilience of Mauritanian slavery
range from the ethnocentric and racialized18 prejudice,19 using proprietary,20
class or caste21 based justifications22 on one end of the spectrum, to a crude
form of environmental determinism on the other end.23 Accompanying these
differing explanations are legal remedies in the form of various abolition
measures that have been contradictorily interpreted as being simultaneously
ineffective while at the same time contributing to the decline of slavery.24
We propose to examine Mauritania’s history of slavery and abolition to
demonstrate the peril of a “vertical” analytical framework bound by national
concerns. Mauritania’s experience demonstrates that while many of the
antislavery and anti-trafficking initiatives are domestic in origin and form,
the practices they purport to combat are better understood as transnational
and regional. A brief examination of Mauritania’s experience with abolition
highlights the problems encountered by site-specific “vertical” narratives of
slavery, trafficking and anti-trafficking. On the one hand, given that slavery
in Mauritania has been banned on at least five, possibly more, occasions,
with different legal pronouncements over a period of at least ninety years,
the resilience of the institution is clearly apparent. On the other hand,
Mauritanian slavery is frequently depicted as “dying” and/or in decline, the
implication being that the tightening and enforcement of legal prohibitions
will ultimately prove effective.25 Which is it? Is Mauritanian slavery so
“secret” an institution that it will forever evade extermination?26 Or is
slavery “slowly” dying and just needs further encouragement?
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A. The Case of Mauritania: Why a Vertical Approach is Analytically
Deficient
The history of abolition in Mauritania is instructive of perils of the
vertical approach to analyzing trafficking and anti-trafficking. From the
earliest records, the experience of enslavement and trafficking in the region
challenges the site-specific narrative of slavery and abolition. By some
calculations, between eleven and eighteen million individuals exited Africa
across the Sahara Desert and the Red Sea from the year 650 to 1900.27
For millennia, the region that is today Mauritania was a hinterland source
for slaves transported north across the Sahara into the Mediterranean region.
Africans, residing in what is now Mauritania, were traded north in to the
Phoenician and Roman Empires and its successors. Slavery played a
prominent role first in Islamicization and subsequently in Islamic society,
prior to European expansion. Until the mid-nineteenth century, it was also a
site for transportation west across the Atlantic Ocean. Slavery and slave
trading continued to evolve as French imperial control waxed and waned.
While coastal slave markets experienced a “slow death,” interior markets
remained active well into the twentieth century.
1. Pre-Colonial Slave Trading to the Nineteenth Century
Slavery and slave trading featured prominently in the processes of
Islamicization, which extended south from Mediterranean North Africa
from the ninth century over the Sahara and along the coast. Slavery was
central to the Saharan economy and the emergence of Islamic states in what
is now Mauritania and to its immediate neighbors. Because these trading
routes were so valuable, the Moroccan Sultan, Moulay Ismail (1672–1727),
raised a corps of 150,000 African slaves—his “Black Guard”—to coerce the
region into submission.28
Historians have documented how the rights of enslavers, enslaved and
slave-owners were codified in Islamic law.29 Contestation over slaves was
often the site fatwas.30 Indeed, Maliki reference manuals circulated in
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Mauritania and provided clear definitions with respect to slavery and slave
transactions.31
The first African slaves brought to Portugal in 1444 came from Cape
Branco, in what is today northern Mauritania. Between 1450 and 1500,
approximately 80,000 slaves were taken from the region to farm
Portuguese-held islands in the Atlantic. From Mauritania, the Portuguese
moved their way down the western coast of Africa, establishing contact at
the Cape of Good Hope and eastward to the Swahili coast, fomenting the
slave trade in their wake.32
Slavery trading, both regional and trans-continental, markedly increased
in Mauritania in the nineteenth century.33 While the trans-Atlantic trade
declined, slave raiding inland expanded rapidly.34 Historian Ghislaine
Lydon has underscored the widespread and prominent social and economic
role of slave-based transactions in the many states and communities
occupying the area that is now Mauritania.35
However, because much of these diverse trades were exporting schemes,
oriented in the north and/or west, and predating the existence of the modern
republic of Mauritania, they rarely feature in analyses of slavery within
Mauritania today.36 This shows that a strictly state-specific “vertical” view
ignores slave movements of this nature predating the existence of the
modern nation, and in so doing, substantiates the mistaken notion that
slavery today has no connection to past slave trading.37
2. Impact of French Empire and Colonization
The French monarchy’s interest in slaves from the Senegal hinterland and
Mauritanian region waxed from the mid-1600s as France took control of
Dutch-held islands in the Caribbean. Realizing slaves were the key to the
success of its new Caribbean holdings, the French kingdom financed the
creation of a slave trading monopoly, the Compagnie des Indes
Occidentales, in 1664. In 1672, the French in Senegal offered a bounty of
ten livres per slave transported to the Indies. The success of this endeavor
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spurred the French to charter a second monopoly in 1673. By 1679, the
Compagnie du Sénégal had twenty-one ships servicing the ports drawing
slaves from the Mauritanian hinterland. During the 1730s, the French
shipped more than 100,000 slaves from its ports on the West African coast.
The bounty for each slave increased periodically and reached 160 livres by
1787.38
As the trans-Atlantic slave trade began to fall into disfavor in the late
eighteenth century, the economy and society of the region that is now
Mauritania was again transformed. The French Republic first declared
universal emancipation in 1794, but the declaration did not ban the traffic in
slaves. As enforcement of the abolition proclamation proved difficult in the
Caribbean, the reintroduction of slavery by Napoleon in 1804 was not
particularly contentious.39
The slave trade in what is now Senegal and Mauritania continued
undisturbed until France’s first abolition act. In 1817, the French monarchy
decreed the banning of the slave trade in the French Caribbean territories,
and in 1818, formally banned French sailors from participating in the trade.
The traders, however, responded creatively to these constraints. For
example, they registered their ships outside France and redirected the trade
that would have gone to the Caribbean to and from Portuguese and Spanish
held territories, such as Brazil and Cuba. French négriers shipped 4,000
slaves per annum in the 1820s. From 1814–1830, Guadeloupe absorbed
38,000 slaves, Martinique 24,000, and Guiane 14,000.
In 1830, under King Louis-Philippe, the slave trade in the four anciennes
colonies of Senegal and its Mauritanian hinterland was again criminalized.
Although the illicit trade continued, all the French colonies abolished
slavery in 1848.40 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the area that is
today Mauritania increasingly fell under French control; and as a result, by
the 1850s, emancipation and abolition were official imperial policy. It
remained so as imperial authority extended south from Algeria into the
Sahara, and west from the Four Communes of Senegal.
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Despite a formal policy forbidding slavery, the French imperial armies
nonetheless both liberated and enslaved communities as they extended
control inland.41 In response, between 1856 and 1908, a French antislavery
organization established five villages of freedom (villages de liberté) for
those liberated from slavery in the southern part of what is now Mauritania,
an area predominantly inhabited by black communities.42 In the face of
opposition from traditional rulers, however, this policy was abandoned.
Ending slavery was a core element of French colonial policy in
Mauritania, and it involved a variety of legal and military methods.43 France
recommitted to formally end slavery in its French colonial possessions
when it signed the Brussels Act in 1890. Formal colonial authority over
Mauritania began with the decree of June 16, 1895, which created the
French West African Federation (AOF) one year after the establishment of
the Ministry for Colonies.44 Ostensibly an entity for coordinating French
presence in West Africa, the AOF regulated trade and the movements of
populations.45 The AOF governed Mauritania directly from Senegal, the
capital of the AOF, and the region’s traditional rulers were brought under
French control.
“Pacification,” as it was called, was a brutal process spearheaded by
Xavier Coppolani (at least partly because of ethnic tensions at the root of
the ongoing trans-Saharan slave trade into Ottoman-ruled northern Africa).
Coppolani fought various groups and won concessions from others. The
Zawiya tribes sought protection against the slave raids of Hassane warriors,
and Coppolani formed alliances with two Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhoods,
marabouts Shaykh Sidya Baba and Shaykh Saad Bouh. The elevated role
accorded them in the colonial administration was exchanged for their
religious influence over local emirs reluctant to accept French rule. Military
threats reined in the emirates of Tagant, Trarza, and Brakna in 1903–04. But
the northern Adrar emirate—backed by a third Qadiriyya marabout, Shaykh
Ma al-’Aynayn and the Sultan of Morocco—was more resistant. Coppolani
was assassinated near Adrar in 1905. The same year, the French issued a
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decree extending the 1848 abolition to all colonies, effectively banning
slavery throughout the AOF. Adrar was eventually defeated and forcibly
incorporated into Mauritania in 1912, but revolts, slave raids, and
trafficking in persons persisted.46
While French imperial policy transformed slavery and trafficking in
slaves internally, the external (primarily Moroccan Ottoman) demand
continued. The region was also subject to new international agreements
attempting to mitigate transregional traffic. After the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire in 1919, the General Act of Berlin of 1885, and the
Brussels Act of 1890 were reaffirmed with the Convention of SaintGermain-en-Laye and the 1926 League of Nations Slavery Convention.
Signatories reasserted their “intention of securing the complete suppression
of slavery in all its forms and of the slave trade by land and sea.”47 From
1926, the colony of Mauritania, part of French West Africa, was subject to
the new treaty. France continued to implement abolitionist policies and
extend its control over Mauritania until 1939, but, as historian Ann
McDougall observes, “the institution of domestic slavery, as distinct from
the slave trade, remained virtually untouched by official policy.”48
As the French incorporated Mauritania into the AOF, they encountered
significant resistance from local communities. Mid-twentieth-century
Mauritania remained very much a nineteenth-century decentralized society
dominated by nomadic and semisedentary Arabo-Berber pastoralists
(Moors), with Wolof and Tukolor sedentary farming communities located
primarily along the Senegal River tributaries in the south. Enslaved black
Africans and descendents of freed slaves bound by clientage to their former
masters existed throughout all echelons of Mauritanian society. A 1904
census report from the AOF included the term “non-free,” and listed 2
million of 8.25 million total inhabitants as part of this category.49 French
colonial historian, Jean Suret-Canale explained that the “term ‘non-free’
[was] a euphemism which the administration imposed . . . to avoid protests
which the proper term would” provoke.50 In areas of Mauritania the rate

VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 2 • 2011

609

610 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

was as high as fifty percent of the local population. Several decades later the
French governor of Mauritania observed that the colony was not yet ready
“for mass liberation” in the model of neighboring Senegal, Guinea, and
Gambia.51 The French feared that freed slaves would have “nothing to do
but turn to theft and vagabondage. . . [T]he end result would be the ruin of
the economy.”52 McDougall has argued that although the French insisted
enforcement of abolition in Mauritania would be difficult, slavery in the
region was “per se much the same as in other Muslim regions along the
West African sahel-southern Sahara.”53 So despite the fact that the French
announced a policy of abolition, they understood that Mauritanian chiefs’
and nobles’ slaves would “stay” with them. In this way, slavery was both
prohibited by new law, and de facto permitted by enforcement of new law.
3. Post-Independence Patterns
The conflicting forces, those for and against slavery, continued the
struggle between new prohibitions and lax enforcement into the
postcolonial era. The colonial policy until independence in 1960 was
structured around the power of the “grands nomades.”54 The French insisted
that the region was simply too large to enforce abolition; therefore,
abolition was confined to validating the freedom of runaway slaves who
claimed mistreatment and prohibiting the “traffic” in slaves.
Notwithstanding this distinction between slave-holding and slavetrafficking, stories of slaves being bought and sold, freed individuals being
kidnapped, and slaves purchasing their freedom, abound during the colonial
period. One such story includes a 1929 French law that formally recognized
the right of a master to include slaves in customary inheritance settlements.
While such judicial support for this seemingly contradictory policy
provoked consternation among colonial officials, colonial law appeared to
contribute to the expansion of slavery and trafficking in the region rather
than end it.55 In fact, McDougall suggests that the percentage of the
Mauritanian population accorded one form of slave status—haratin—
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actually rose from 2 to 50 percent from 1910 to 1950.56 Thus, although
Mauritania took some strides in the last half-century towards eradicating
slavery, recent social and political setbacks continue to impede its progress.
This back and forth underscores the problem of a vertical approach to
slavery and abolition, insofar as it fails to take into account the role
Mauritania played in regional and continental slavery and trafficking. For
example, Mauritania attained independence in 1960, and though abolition
was reaffirmed in the 1961 Constitution (which incorporated the principles
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), between 1960 and 1980,
slave trafficking and slave raids in Mauritania continued.57
A “racialized” enslavement, of black Africans by lighter skinned Moors,
is often highlighted as a factor contributing to the political instability of the
region that was a site of multiple military coups d’états.58 One such coup in
1980 brought to power a military “salvation” government. The Military
Committee for National Salvation issued a Proclamation on July 5, 1980,
and an executive order, number 81.234 on November 9, 1981, abolishing
slavery. These two statutory vehicles recognized the fact that certain forms
of slavery continued to exist in Mauritania. Furthermore, a subsequent land
reform act in 1983 restructured tenancy and occupancy law in order to
prohibit the serfdom normally tied to landholdings.
Additionally, in 1984 Marc Bossuyt, of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN
Commission on Human Rights, visited Mauritania “to study the situation
prevailing in Mauritania with regard to slavery and the slave trade with a
view to assessing that country’s needs in its struggle to end such
practices.”59 Accompanied by Peter Davies of Anti-Slavery International,
Mr. Bossuyt announced to the United Nations in 1984 that abolition had
indeed taken effect. He recommended that the government of Mauritania
create a specific body entrusted with the following tasks: coordination of
the struggle against slavery to which any person experiencing difficulties in
that field could apply; implementation of further civil status legislation
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reform to help former slaves become conscious of their legal status as free;
and invitations to religious authorities to explain why, in their view,
abolition conformed with shari’a.60
4. 2007 Slavery Act
Notwithstanding Mr. Bossuyt’s recommendation, Amnesty International
reported in 2002 that there was no evidence that a commission was ever
created to compensate those subjected to slavery.61 Instead, it noted that the
Mauritanian government flatly denied the existence of slavery and related
human rights abuses. In September 2001, before the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child, the Mauritanian government stated, “Mauritanian
society had never known servitude, exclusion or discrimination, either in
the pre-colonial or colonial period or since independence, and so no
vestiges of such practices could thus persist.”62 Others have argued that
slavery in Mauritania is essentially an economic model that requires a
process of financial emancipation.63
The 2003 USDOS TIP report confirmed that slavery and its related
human rights abuses still exist in Mauritania. In a special comment the
USDOS TIP report stated:
The problem in Mauritania deals with reports of internal trafficking
in persons, primarily for forced labor. Slavery was prohibited in
1981, but some former slaves reportedly work without
remuneration to retain access to the land they traditionally farmed.
We have no hard data on the numbers of individuals in forced labor
situations. Lack of economic alternatives and deeply embedded
psychological and tribal bonds make it difficult for many
individuals who had ancestors who were slaves to leave their
former masters. Adult females reportedly often find it difficult to
leave servitude because former masters may claim to be the father
of the children and refuse to allow the children to leave. Trafficking
of children occurs for domestic servitude and forced labor. Some
children are trafficked to the Middle East as camel jockeys.64
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Government representatives responded to these criticisms with the
argument that because the 1981 statute abolished slavery, all that remained
were its economic, social, and cultural after-effects of slavery, not slavery
itself.
But then, in a seeming admission of the failures of the 1980s
emancipation, the government adopted the Act for the Suppression of
Trafficking in Persons (Act No. 2007-048). The law criminalized the
recruitment, transport, and transfer of persons by threat or force for sexual
and economic exploitation. Criminal penalties included hard labor for life
for those convicted of such crimes.65
On September 3, 2007, the Slavery Act criminalizing and punishing
slavery came into force. Article 2 of the Act defines slavery as “the exercise
of all or some of the rights of property over one or more persons.”66 Article
3 prohibits “discrimination, in any form, against a person alleged to be a
slave.”67 According to the act, the crime of slavery occurs when “any person
reduces another person or a person under their care or responsibility, to
slavery or incites them to forfeit their liberty or dignity, for the purpose of
enslaving them” and “is punishable by 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment and a
fine of approximately US $2,000–4,000.”68 The law also codifies “offences
of slavery,” which are punishable with prison sentences of between six
months and two years and a fine.”69 “Offences of slavery include[:]
appropriating goods, products or earnings resulting from the labor of a
slave; prejudicing the physical integrity of a slave[;] or denying the child of
a slave access to education.”70
Like the 1981 order, the new law also provides for assistance and
monetary compensation to those released from slavery and criminalizes
practices such as the sexual exploitation of female slaves by their masters
and the act of seeking to justify slavery. In addition, those who fail to
pursue an investigation of alleged slavery, including governors, prefects,
local chiefs, and police officers, may be liable to prison sentences and a
fine.71 Thus, again the law was expanded to include a variety of new forms
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of slavery, labor coercion, and trafficking, but there is little in the way of
implementation, funding, and enforcement.
Despite its robust language, this new law underscores the observation
that the antislavery and anti-trafficking laws of Mauritania, once passed, are
never implemented. Although UN Special Rapporteur Gulnara Shahinian,
who investigated slavery in Mauritania, commended the enactment of the
2007 Slavery Act for providing a clear message that slavery will not be
tolerated in Mauritania, she has since emerged as a critic of the law. In the
four years since its passage, no case has been brought before the courts
based on the new law. Ms. Shahinian noted that, “[t]he law addresses only
the individual criminal liability of slaveholders; it thus relies entirely on the
police and prosecution for its enforcement. In interviews with both
government officials and civil society representatives, enforcement was
raised as a problem that allows slavery to continue.”72 Despite the enormous
public fanfare about the new law, little has changed. In 2009, the Ministry
of Justice created a commission to review the law and provide suggestions
on how to strengthen it, in view of the fact that no one had ever been
prosecuted under the law.
5. Failure of the 2007 Act
The 2007 law provided a mechanism whereby human rights workers
could denounce slave-like practices;73 however, instead of prosecuting
slavery, the Mauritanian government is now prosecuting those who
denounce slavery.74 From contemporary accounts it appears that slavery is
alive and well in Mauritania, and that the law is not being enforced.75 And
even the UN Rapporteur is backpedaling on her earlier praise of the law.
She now describes it as “too vague in its definition of slavery, as many
master-servant dependencies—often encompassing former slavery bonds—
fell short of inclusion in the antislavery policy.”76
The 2010 USDOS TIP report notes that Mauritania is “a source and
destination country for men, women, and children subjected to trafficking in
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persons, specifically conditions of forced labor and commercial sexual
exploitation.”77 But the otherwise generic preamble is followed by an
observation unique to Mauritania, insofar as the USDOS identified the
existence of “traditional slave castes” wherein men, women, and children
“are subjected to slavery-related practices, rooted in ancestral master-slave
relationships,” forms of which “continue to exist in a limited fashion in both
rural and urban settings.”78 According to the USDOS, “these individuals,
held for generations by slave-holding families, may be forced to work
without pay,” in a variety of occupations, including “cattle herders and
household help.”79 And because the government “does not fully comply
with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not
making significant efforts to do so,” Mauritania was only one of three subSaharan African nations to be accorded the 2010 TIP report’s lowest
classification for anti-trafficking activity: Tier Three.80
From this vertical narrative it becomes apparent that Mauritania is the site
of repeated attempts at abolition and enforcement of anti-trafficking laws.
Constitutional articles, decrees, orders, and acts of legislation have been
enacted, promulgated, and pronounced with little success. But more
importantly, the Mauritanian state’s apparent inefficacy is reified as a
national issue and domestic cultural attachment.81 One would be forgiven
for thinking that there is something particularly Mauritanian about slavery,
because it is difficult to see the regional persistence of slavery and the
regional dimensions of antislavery action without comparing the processes
of abolition with neighboring regions.
This vertical approach to slavery and abolition just described is
unworkable because state-driven narratives obfuscate the fact that similar
experiences and processes are ongoing simultaneously throughout the West
African region. As shown above, the repeated nation-centric remedies fail to
account for both the regional trafficking networks and flows and the
persistence of cultural practices underpinning slave-based economies far
beyond the national boundaries of Mauritania. Moreover, the nature of these
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processes of abolition, and the implications of a regional and transnational
dynamic only become apparent with a horizontal description of the types of
abolitionist activities. Part two will show how a horizontal approach to
slavery and abolition will be much more effective than looking at nationstates in isolation.

II. THE “TREND” REVEALED: A “HORIZONTAL” APPROACH TO
ABOLITION AND ANTI-TRAFFICKING
The African continent has a rich history of abolition and anti-trafficking
laws. From the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade via early imperial
expansion, to the mature period of colonial rule, Africa has been the site of
important experiments in antislavery legislation. African social, political,
and economic systems were reshaped in response to successive attempts to
extinguish slavery and slave trades. Over the course of approximately two
hundred years, as the slave trades and slavery were progressively abolished
in different regions of the globe, the African continent was often among the
first regions to experience broad abolition experiments.82 And as the many
stages, or trends, of abolition transformed what was previously a legal
economic activity into an illegal and illicit practice, new legislative
responses were spawned. Each trend provides insight into the nature of
slavery and the legal framework of abolition.
Although the first acts of abolition were promulgated in Europe and
North America, their focus was on the origins of the trans-Atlantic slave
trade in Africa. Anti-trafficking efforts thus outwardly extended both
spatially and temporally from continental Africa. An examination of the
successive attempts to legislate abolition demonstrates the centrality of the
region to anti-trafficking initiatives insofar as many legislative endeavors
envisioned ending slavery on the continent. Similarly, mechanisms to
combat evasion of new laws banning the trade that were geographically
focused on West Africa were slowly extended to other areas. For example,
naval patrols, freedom courts, freedom colonies, and other physical
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realizations of legislative goals fanned out from West Africa across the
Atlantic to the New World.
In this context of expanding illegality, categories and identities emerged
and were reinforced by subsequent legislation. For example, women and
children became increasingly visible as objects of enslavement and subjects
of antislavery legislation, because slavers actively attempted to circumvent
controls on the slave trade.83 For example, the 1788 “Dolben’s Act” limited
the number of slaves carried by British vessels, thus raising transportation
costs and diminishing the incentive for slavers to ship low-value slaves such
as children.84
Normative practices of enslavement shifted in the context of the
emergence and expansion of international abolitionist legal frameworks in
the Atlantic world from the early 1800s onward. In contrast to the effect of
the Dolben Act, historian Jelmer Vos argues that the proportion of child
slaves grew after Britain withdrew from the trade and reached especially
high levels during the illegal phase of trafficking in West Central Africa. At
that time, practically one in two slaves sold in the Congo ports was under
fifteen years old.85 Moreover, the formal colonization of Africa from the
late nineteenth century coincided with a renewed commitment to end the
slave trade in African colonies. Thus, nineteenth-century legislative agendas
and enforcement strategies are important antecedents to the late twentieth
and early twenty-first century campaigns against enslavement and
trafficking. In the following sections, we examine characteristics of five
trends of legislative action over time that ultimately provide the backdrop
for predictions about the efficacy of current attempts at abolition.
A. The Pelagic Trend: Prohibiting Oceanic Slave Trading
The first identifiable trend began in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries as European powers contemplated abolition of the
trans-Atlantic trade. This trend focused on Africans being removed from the
continent. For convenience, we identify this as the pelagic trend because the
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legislative enactments are almost exclusively focused on prohibiting crossocean trade. The reconceptualization of the slave trade as slave traffic was a
fundamental rhetorical intervention reflecting legislative and diplomatic
initiatives that progressively eroded support for the slave trade.86
The pelagic trend began with Denmark in 1792. Following the Danish
Kingdom’s prohibition of the slave trade for its nationals, Britain pursued
aggressive international diplomacy designed to compel or “shame” other
slave trading nations into joining the prohibition on the trade.87
The Atlantic trade operated under gradually tightening constraints
spanning many decades from 1792 to 1867. The ban on British-flagged and
American-flagged vessels transporting slaves came in effect in 1808. At
about the same period, the British established Sierra Leone, and its port of
Freetown, as its base for the first antislaving naval patrols. An 1810 treaty
eroded the Portuguese trade and banned the slave trade in the North
Atlantic. In 1817, a decree by Louis XVIII abolished the French trade, and
Portugal signed a treaty with Britain conceding the “Right of Search”
(allowing the Royal Navy to search vessels suspected of trading slaves).
“Mixed Commissions” were established to regulate the slave trade south of
the equator (i.e., to Brazil). Spain also signed a treaty with Britain
abolishing the slave trade north of the equator with similar conditions and
committed to abolishing the slave trade entirely after May 30, 1820.88
One of the fundamental contributions of this first trend was its emphasis
on the relationship between national legislative action and diplomatic
pressure. It has been widely observed that the British parliament’s decision
to withdraw from the trade was a leap of faith only made effective by the
British government’s subsequent relentless cajoling and bullying of other
nations to make similar commitments.
A secondary matter, so obvious in hindsight but revolutionary at the time,
was the decoupling of slavery from the slave trade. The decision to abandon
the trade and force other nations to follow suit reflected a widely held belief
among abolitionists that ending slavery and slave-based economies could
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only be accomplished once the legal traffic ceased. This piecemeal
abolitionist hypothesis partly explains the incremental early successes of
abolitionists in North America, and also the stonewalling of abolitionists
toward midcentury. For example, while the United States ended slave
imports in 1808, it was not until 1820 that overtly abolitionist legislation
gained traction with the passage of the Piracy Law declaring the American
slave trade an act of piracy punishable by death.89 The abolitionist agenda
was furthered on a state-by-state legislative basis, as members of the Union
explored avenues to resettle former slaves in West Africa.90
B. The Telluric Trend: Wholesale Emancipation of Slave Populations
The second trend of African abolition dismantled colonial and imperial
slave systems on the ground in the Americas and Asia, and spanned circa
1830–70. Its focus was on enslaved populations laboring in colonial
territories, including Africans already removed from the continent. We
name this second trend the telluric trend, because it was concerned with
land-based slavery. This second trend primarily involved the wholesale
emancipation of working populations who subsequently largely remained in
situ or close proximity to their locus of enslavement. While individual
colonial powers approached the issue of slavery on an individual basis,
viewed historically, the existence of a trend of antislavery legislation is
incontrovertible.
Abolition of slavery during this telluric trend extended far beyond the
African continent, and patterns of abolition in the West Indies were
imported to British India. From 1833–38 the British Empire dismantled
slavery in its colonies (but not in its protectorates or dependencies) followed
by France in 1848.91 By the 1840s the United States and United Kingdom
joined forces in policing the Atlantic. And throughout the 1850s the slave
trade and indeed slavery were progressively abolished throughout Central
and South America.92 British colonial India featured prominently in this
second legislative trend. Henry Bartle Frere estimated a population upwards
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of sixteen million slaves in all of India in 1841.93 The Indian Slavery Act of
1843 abolished slavery in both Hindu and Muslim India. A revision of the
Indian Penal Code in 1861 formally made the enslavement of human beings
a criminal offense.94 This wholesale emancipation grappled with
considerably greater volumes of people than the previous trend.
Out of this second trend emerged an issue of fundamental importance for
future abolition efforts, namely, the considerable propensity for former
slaves to remain on or near their former slave compounds, but
simultaneously create their own discrete domestic and laboring economies.
This underscores a central strength of the “horizontal” approach insofar as it
facilitates a comparative perspective with respect to emancipation over
large regions and territories.95 Anxieties about slave departures and the
collapse of economies had fueled proslavery activism. But the
transformations visited on economies in postemancipation societies
confounded both abolitionists and slavery apologists from the West Indies
to India. Postemancipation upheavals in the Western hemisphere and India
were fodder for subsequent policy enactments in Africa.
Like the first trend, the legal processes of emancipation were exclusively
domestic in origin and buttressed by diplomacy and negotiation. As ever
more regions and modalities came under scrutiny, illegality of the slave
trade, established via bilateral and multilateral treaties but enacted by
domestic statute, continued to fan out across the Atlantic and Indian worlds
over several decades continuing into the 1860s. But the stakes raised by
wholesale emancipation were considerably higher than those pertaining to
banning the traffic in economies where slave numbers were stable or
increasing.
The US affection for slavery collapsed in the violence of civil war, and
the final abolition statutes were passed by Cuba and Brazil in 1886 and
1888 respectively after intense domestic struggles.96 This abolition trend
thus shows how similar processes in adjoining and nonadjoining territories
had complementing effects. Different regions of the world drew on the
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abolition experiences of other regions, and legislative responses built on and
adapted those of regions that had already enacted the wholesale
emancipation of enslaved populations.
C. The Imperial Trend: Extending Abolition into Africa
The third, imperial trend of legislative abolition is situated on the African
continent. The name, imperial, connotes the epoch and also the ideological
motivation behind the abolition policy. The previous trends prohibited the
removal of Africans from the continent, and subsequently the coercion of
labor of those already removed. The imperial trend of legislative abolition
had a new focus: on slave trading and enslavement within Africa, including
what was sometimes referred to as domestic or African slavery, to
distinguish it from the trans-Atlantic slave trade and plantation slavery in
the New World. The trend is imperial because abolition went hand in hand
with the expansion of “legitimate” commerce in Africa.97 While the
preceding pelagic and telluric legislative trends concerned Africans
removed from the continent, the imperial trend extended antislavery
activities deep into the continent and its statutory basis was new and
innovative.
Extending antislavery legislation into the African continent was an
important departure from the previous trends because it represented a new
move to change political, economic, and social life within Africa.
Beginning with the Berlin Declaration of 1885 and the Brussels Act of
1890, European powers with African colonial interests or aspirations
regularly and repeatedly agreed to ban the slave trade and end slavery in
their colonial possessions.98 As they seized control of territories and moved
military forces inland, decrees and proclamations proclaimed the end of
slavery. Whether Nigeria or South Africa, Tanganyika or Senegal, colonial
powers announced that their regimes would no longer enforce requests by
slaveholders to sustain claims on coerced labor.
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Yet while colonial powers formally abolished slavery in colonies,
protectorates, and newly “pacified” territories, they often did little to
enforce the legislation or decrees. European powers established special
courts to hear freedom petitions and navigate the proliferation of claims of
repossession by disgruntled former masters, but slave owners faced an
uphill battle to recover labor or compensation. Slave forms persisted, as did
slave trades, but the scale of enslavement and trade diminished from its
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century heights.99
The imperial trend of abolition was a marked departure from earlier
processes in several respects. It speaks to the value of a horizontal analysis
by revealing some of the early political considerations informing a regionwide programmatic endeavor in Africa. First, abolition featured as a
commitment undergirding the political project of imperial expansion.
Second, emancipation was disseminated by proclamation to territories only
partially under imperial control, albeit via colonial officials employed by
regimes steered by popular assemblies to varying degrees. Third, for all
intents and purposes, emancipation was directed exclusively at Africans:
Africans trafficking and enslaving other Africans. And fourth, the processes
of emancipation, including tribunal hearings and freedom petitions,
revealed the deeply gendered character of coerced labor on the continent.
While the first three of these differences were apparent to imperial
powers to varying degrees, the fourth came as a surprise. Women were
central to the expansion of slavery during the nineteenth and twentieth
century, and indigenous articulations of Islamic law shielded many
communities from the Eurocentric legislative paradigms of abolition.100
Moreover, the extension of abolition to the continent was not without
other side effects. For example, somewhat paradoxically, efforts to suppress
the slave trade in the Atlantic appear to have stimulated the trade in the
Indian Ocean.101 Indeed, historians Gwyn Campbell and Ned Alpers and
legal scholar, Bernard Freamon, hypothesize that the greatest expansion of
the slave trade in the Indian Ocean occurred in the nineteenth century.102
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These are important observations with respect to a horizontal analysis,
because they underscore how actions in one part of Africa affect other
regions.103 It is inadequate to explore abolition or antislavery strategies on a
state-by-state basis.
D. The Colonial Trend: Expanding International Scrutiny
The fourth, colonial, trend of abolition began in the early twentieth
century with the 1904 and 1910 revision of the International Convention for
the Suppression of the White Traffic, and was extended by the creation of
the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization after World
War I. We call it colonial because it coincided with “mature” colonial rule
in Africa, and the language of many of its signature elements resonated with
the paternalist overtones of classical colonial ideologies.104 The 1910
convention was an important recognition of the highly ethnicized and
racialized framework of previous legislative approaches to abolition insofar
as it directed attention to a group heretofore ignored by legislators.105 The
value of a horizontal approach to examining antislavery and anti-trafficking
legislation is clearly visible here insofar as the legal instruments envisioned
for anti-trafficking were regional in terms of vision. Treaties and
conventions were not bilateral or unilateral, nor did they represent actions
by individual colonial parties. Rather, by emerging from international
negotiation, they paved the way for future expansive global negotiations
resulting in the creation of anti-trafficking instruments.
While the 1910 Convention represented a formative step in a tentative
international regime designed to criminalize and suppress the increasingly
organized international trafficking of white women for the sex trade, it was
only one of a new trend of international legislative tools enacted in a variety
of contexts. The 1910 Convention prefigured a revitalization of
humanitarian sensibilities that informed the first trend of anti-trafficking
legislation, but it differed insofar as it acknowledged the persistence of
slavery and the necessity of distinguishing between legitimate migration
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patterns and trafficking in coerced labor.106 The subsequent 1926 Slavery
Convention of the League of Nations expanded the remit of anti-trafficking
by wading cautiously into the previously unchartered territory of colonial
power.
The fourth trend built on a key innovation of the third—namely,
internationally negotiated settlements and definitions—and it expanded the
reach of both. While the 1890 Brussels Convention reinforced imperial
authority with a moral obligation, the fourth trend of abolition emerged in
the context of an explicit critique of colonial practices.107 Growing
international revulsion about persistence of slavery and coerced labor in
colonial Africa provoked the Council of the League of Nations to appoint,
in 1922, a Temporary Slavery Commission to report to the League on the
prevalence of slavery among member states and their respective territories.
The 1924 report on slavery embarrassed member states, including many
colonial powers.108
One direct result of the report was a requirement by the League of
Nations Permanent Mandates Commission that colonial mandate powers
report regularly about the status of slavery and the slave trade and efforts at
suppression.109 This reporting mechanism effectively exposed European
colonies to scrutiny with respect to colonial labor practices and resulted in
intensified policing of African workers and the workplace.110 The 1930
Forced Labor Convention further diminished the capacity of colonial
powers to dictate labor standards.111 While the League was notoriously
weak and colonial states had limited capacity to broadcast power to the
distant margins of colonies, this fourth trend of legislative action deeply
altered the structure of labor coercion in colonial Africa.112
A secondary issue emerging from this fourth trend was the widespread
acknowledgement of the gender of slavery. By the 1940s, coerced labor in
sub-Saharan Africa was comprised almost exclusively of women and
children.113 While the imperial trend of emancipation made this apparent,
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the colonial trend incorporated language to this effect into the text of new
laws and treaties.114
E. The Postcolonial Trend: Redomesticating Anti-Trafficking
A fifth, postcolonial, trend of anti-trafficking activity was ushered in
following World War II and the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948). We use the phrase “postcolonial” to highlight both
the time period of this trend (immediately upon independence) and elements
of the anticolonial and nativist context of legislative processes in newly
independent nations. The declaration, signed by European colonial powers
and incorporated into many newly independent African nations’
constitutions, mandated universal freedom and the explicit abolition of all
forms of slavery, servitude, and the trade in slaves. Conventions first
extended the anti-trafficking remit of the UN beyond “white women” to all
of womankind.115 While the second half of the twentieth century witnessed
an increasing public awareness of the persistence of slavery, the first
movement to acknowledge a variety of what might be collectively described
as “unfreedoms”116 among the many newly independent African nations
was achieved when the UN General Assembly passed the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery in 1956.117 This convention prohibited
“practices similar to slavery,” including debt bondage, serfdom, coerced
marriages, and exploitation of child labor.118
The principal characteristic of the fifth trend was the redomestication of
the antislavery and abolitionist legislative paradigm following the models of
the previous trends, insofar as antislavery action becomes once again a
domestic affair. The pelagic trend enshrined the central role of domestic
legislative action to antislavery campaigns. Whereas international
negotiation was a key characteristic of the imperial and colonial trends, the
fifth trend differed markedly. The colonial and imperial trends broadened
and internationalized the definitions of “freedom” and “practices similar to
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slavery,” because more nations were able to be part of the deliberative
process. By contrast, with the enactment of international treaties and
conventions as domestic legislative apparatuses, the postcolonial trend
reified the enforcement of international mandates and human rights as an
exclusively domestic undertaking.119 In the urgency to establish and cement
the meaning of independence and the end of colonial rule, many African
nations adopted distinctly defensive and even nativist attitudes to external
criticism of the persistence within their territories of coerced labor and the
traffic in humans.120 Thus in the postcolonial world, newly independent
African nations chartered an anti-trafficking and abolition course that
mirrored actions of the earlier trends. An examination of antislavery and
anti-trafficking legislation subsequent to the domestic implementation of
the 1956 convention reveals the value of the horizontal framework of
analysis.

III. CONTEMPORARY LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TRAFFICKING IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
As demonstrated by the earlier overview of Mauritanian history, many
analyses of antislavery and anti-trafficking initiatives fail to account for the
relationship between national actions and convergent regional or
transnational events. In contrast with national, vertical narratives, the macro
analytical model puts national actions in regional and transnational context.
And the horizontal approach also demonstrates the existence of larger-scale
processes or trends.
A specific legislative trend may have leaders and followers. It may
involve pressures and incentives. Closer scrutiny of the five aforementioned
trends would further reveal the complex processes at play, although such an
examination is beyond the scope of this article. We offer a description of
these trends primarily to demonstrate the value of the horizontal approach
of larger-scale, regional analysis. Within each legislative trend, there are
variations with respect to the specific action taken and instruments adopted.
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As we shall see, the current “neo-abolitionist” legislative trend comprises of
three forms of legislative responses.
A. General Characteristics: When Do Legislative Actions Become a
“Legislative Trend”?
To recap our introductory observation, as a concept, the legislative trend
conveys the idea that a broad, seemingly collaborative program of legal
remedy is underway, affecting multiple legal sites and jurisdictions
simultaneously or successively. An abolitionist legislative trend (i.e., one
focused on ending slavery or trafficking) expands beyond these core
considerations by addressing specific issues emerging from the processes
and practices attendant to enslavement, illicit slave movement, and the full
spectrum of slave-like practices existing under the rubric of labor coercion.
A legislative trend is perhaps more readily identified after some time has
elapsed since the flourish of new legislative activity. The global wave of
domestic violence legislation in the 1980s and early 1990s may be one
example; another would be the surge in “children’s acts” as the international
community enshrined in national law the mandates of the 1989 International
Convention of the Rights of the Child. Indeed, conceived of this way, there
are many legal topics and issues that might ostensibly be interpreted as the
product of a legislative trend.121
At some point individual legislative action by individual states gains the
appearance of a concerted action. We say “appearance” because it would be
unwise to discount the value of domestic legislative agency. At a certain
point this appearance of a concerted action constitutes a legislative trend.
We identify six characteristics of an abolitionist legislative trend. The
characteristics of the legislative trend emerge from the antecedent
experiences of antislavery and anti-trafficking activity.
First, the mooting or promulgation of similar or consistent legislative
apparatuses or legal processes in multiple discretely domestic locations—
nation-states, colonies, or territories—is the initial forewarning of an
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incipient trend. Second, the emergence of a trend is situated at the dynamic
interface between domestic, international law and nongovernmental
activism. Third, the strength of the trend is measured by its capacity to
harness the political, economic, and social pressures afforded by
international diplomacy, nongovernmental activism, and the public
performance of international negotiation. Fourth, a trend is evidenced by the
emergence of differentiation between categories of enslavement and labor
coercion, such as women, children, and the indentured. Fifth, the trend is
visible when legislation appears to respond to shifting modalities of slave
mobility, such as forced migration and human trafficking traversing
borders, subregions, and continents. And finally, the existence of a trend is
reinforced by evidence of a “pushback” or resistance to antislavery efforts
by certain states and nonstate actors.
B. The “Neo-Abolitionist” Trend
Sub-Saharan Africa is currently in the grip of a new contemporary
legislative trend—a sixth, neo-abolitionist trend. We adopt the term “neoabolitionist” to distinguish this current trend from the previous five trends
outlined above. Furthermore, the term draws attention to the collaborative
role of nonstate actors (especially NGOs), in the promulgation of individual
domestic laws. The term “neo-abolitionist” first appeared in the 1960s to
describe the heightened activity of US civil rights advocates and their focus
on legislative remedy.122 Subsequently, neo-abolitionist appears as a
description of a branch of revisionist scholarship reevaluating the
achievements of antebellum abolitionism and postbellum Reconstruction.123
Here, the term neo-abolitionist alludes to the rhetorical interventions and
advocacy operations of contemporary anti-child-trafficking advocacy.124
This neo-abolitionist trend is demonstrable by factors including the
increasing promulgations of new laws since 2000; the coordinated efforts of
international, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies and
organizations; the appearance of new forms of diplomatic, economic, and
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social pressures; the tailoring of legislative remedies to perceived new
forms of enslavement and trafficking; and the resistance to the campaign for
new laws by state, and to a lesser extent nonstate, actors.
From 2000 to 2010, and predating the inception of the USDOS TIP
reports, approximately fifty entirely new individual labor laws, antitrafficking statutes, or significant amendments have been passed by African
legislatures. By late 2010, forty-four of fifty-one sub-Saharan African
nations had passed new antislavery and anti-trafficking statutes.125 A
number of states also have pending or mooted legislation revising,
enhancing, and expanding current law. The passage of new anti-trafficking
laws escalated quickly during the first half of the decade, then briefly
slowed only to resume again quite recently. Chart One below demonstrates
that 2005 was the peak year in terms of the passage of new legislation, and
2008 was the year of the next greatest number of legislative changes.126
Chart One: New, Draft, or Amended Laws, Bills, and Codes Pertaining
to Trafficking in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–2010127
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1. The First Statutes
The contemporary neo-abolitionist legislative trend appears to begin in
2000 with the passage of Malawi’s Employment Act, Act No. 6 of 2000
(Malawi Act). This act was the first significant legal intervention in forced
labor in sub-Saharan Africa in almost two decades. Prior to 2000, very few
African nations had attempted to pass legislation pertaining to coerced labor
or the forced or illicit movement of individuals for exploitative labor
purposes. The only two significant new legislative tools worthy of note—
Mauritania’s aforementioned decree banning slavery and subsequent
statute, and Cote d’Ivoire’s Penal Code revisions—date from the early
1980s.128
Malawi’s 2000 legislation is important because it demonstrates the first
legislative response to an increasing international interest in human
trafficking and labor exploitation, although the Malawi Act predates the TIP
reports. Part II, Section 4 of the Malawi Act described two fundamental
principles, whereby “no person shall be required to perform forced labour,”
and any “person who exacts or imposes forced labour or causes or permits
forced labour shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine of K 10,000
and to imprisonment for two years.”129 Moreover, combined with a revision
of the penal code, the Malawi Act provided for an effective anti-trafficking
response. The 2010 USDOS TIP report noted that “though the country lacks
specific anti-trafficking laws,” Malawi remained in good standing because
it “prohibits all forms of trafficking through various laws.”130 And as we
shall see, Malawi continued to resist pressure for a new law until the
passage of the 2010 Child Care, Protection and Justice Act.
Statutes pertaining to labor and coercion continued to percolate through
legislative assemblies and executive committees for the first several years
of the new millennium, although they were at first few in number. After
Malawi’s Employment Act, Eritrea’s Proclamation No. 118/2001 became
the next important milestone. This proclamation defined forced labor as
“any service which a person performed involuntarily due to the coercion of
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another person,” and highlighted mechanisms of coercion, including “any
work performed involuntarily merely because of someone’s influence as a
result of his holding a public office or traditional status of chieftaincy.”131
Coupled with penalties described in the penal code, Eritrea took an early
stance on labor coercion, if not specifically on trafficking for labor
purposes.132 But where Malawi’s resistance to a specific human trafficking
law was bolstered by demonstrable enforcement of existing statutes, the
2010 USDOS TIP report notes that in spite of establishing these and other
constitutional and statutory tools, Eritrea “has never used these statutes to
prosecute cases of human trafficking.”133
The appearance of statutes and other prosecutorial mechanisms with
specific language directly pertaining to trafficking began in 2002 with the
revision of Mali’s Code Pénal. The February 2002 revision was noticed by
the USDOS’ Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
(OMCTP), which commented in its 2002 TIP report that while Mali “does
not yet fully comply with minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking . . . , it is making significant efforts to do so.”134 Article 244 of
Mali’s code extended the existing definition of illegal contracts that
deprived an individual of liberty to children. By defining trafficking as “the
collective process by which a child is moved or removed internally or
externally from the country in such a condition that s/he is transformed into
a chattel (transforment en valeur marchande) by one or more of the
individuals involved, regardless of the final point of removal of the
child.”135 The substantive definition is expanded to include “any act
involving the recruitment, transportation, concealment, or the true identity
(la vérité) of a child,” and “any act leading to” the removal of a child
internally or externally.136 Punishment for a violation of article 244 is five
to twenty years in prison, which the USDOS observed in 2010 to be
“sufficiently stringent and comparable with penalties for sexual assault.”137
Notwithstanding this observation, the 2009 demotion of Mali to the Tier
Two Watch List indicates that Mali’s government remains under
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considerable pressure from international NGOs and the US government to
adopt comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation.138
2. First Indications of Emerging Distinctions in Legislative Responses
By 2003, the passage of two entirely new laws devoted to human
trafficking explicitly put anti-trafficking law on the legislative radar in subSaharan Africa. Furthermore, 2003 also provided the first instance of a
divergence in legislative response between “child-centric” and “blanket”
approaches to all forms of trafficking. For example, Burkina Faso and
Nigeria passed laws in May and July respectively. Burkina Faso’s Loi No.
038-2003/AN, “portant la défintion et la répression du trafic d’enfant(s),”
adopted on May 27, 2003, defined a child trafficker as “any person who,
independently or in an organized associative capacity, accompanies, incites,
facilitates the movement (le déplacement), transit, or stay or housing (le
séjour) of children,” pursuant to the description of trafficking.139 The
expansive definition of child trafficking included, “any act whereby a child
is recruited, transported, transferred, hous[ed] or welcomed internally or
externally of the country.”140 Punishments included imprisonment up to five
years and a fine up to 1.5 million FCFA.141
By contrast, Nigeria’s Act 23 of 2003 created a National Agency for
Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other Related Matters (NAPTIP). In
so doing, Nigeria elevated human trafficking beyond Burkina Faso’s simple
extension of criminal law to an entirely new administrative level. In
creating NAPTIP, Article 4 of the Nigerian law delegated to an agency the
power of “co-ordination of all laws on traffic in persons and related
offences and the enforcement of those laws,” and the responsibility for the
“adoption of measures to increase the effectiveness of eradication of traffic
in persons.” The text of Act 23 provides expansive categories for antitrafficking enforcement. The definitions of “trafficking” and “trafficked
person” are consistent with evolving international definitions.142
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Interestingly, Nigeria is also the first sub-Saharan anti-trafficking law to
simultaneously deploy the language of slavery, stating:
Any person who imports, exports, removes, buys, sells, disposes,
traffics or deals in any person as a slave or accepts, receives, or
detains a person against that person’s will as a slave, commits an
offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.143
Nigeria’s northern neighbor, Niger, however, elected simply to amend
Article 270 of its penal code to prohibit slavery.144
The fundamental divergence into three legislative responses, to which we
will shortly turn our attention, dates to the actions of Mali, Nigeria, Niger,
and Burkina Faso. The divergence intensified over the next several years,
with small but instructive shifts. In 2004, Namibia and Equatorial Guinea
followed Nigeria and passed laws incorporating language pertaining to
human trafficking.145 Namibia incorporated human trafficking within its
Prevention of Organized Crime Act, No. 29, and is the first law to also
include human organ trafficking.146 Equatorial Guinea melded smuggling
with trafficking in the publication in the Boletín Oficial of the Law on the
Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons. Lesotho followed
Burkina Faso’s lead by adopting the Children’s Welfare and Protection Bill,
which described child trafficking as
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, sale, harbouring or receipt
of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.147
Gabon also passed a child trafficking law.148 Ethiopia, for its part, mirrored
Malian conservatism by revising its criminal code to include language
pertinent to child trafficking.149
The peak year of the decade long legislative trend was 2005 during which
at least twelve new anti-trafficking statutes were promulgated.150 The
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influence of the trafficking definitions standardized in the Palermo
Protocols of 2000 is much clearer in the slew of new laws among those
following Nigeria’s lead. Sierra Leone’s Act No. 7, the Anti-Human
Trafficking Act, adopts the language of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, almost
verbatim.151 The definition of trafficking in Liberia’s Act to Ban Trafficking
in Persons Within the Republic of Liberia mirrors its neighbors’ acts.152 By
contrast, Senegal’s Loi n° 2005-06 “Relative à la lutte contre la Traite des
personnes et Pratiques assimilées et à la Protection des victims,” contained
no definition of trafficking at all. Among those nations adopting a childcentric approach, Cameroon’s Loi n° 2005/015 du 29 décembre 2005
“relative à la lutte contre le trafic et la traite des enfants” incorporated a
definition very similar to Burkina Faso. Mauritius and South Africa passed
child protection acts incorporating terminology on child trafficking. Several
other nations continued processes of revising existing criminal codes and
labor laws, a path that indicates a strong disinclination to embrace the
necessity for new law. Moreover, the new laws of 2005 demonstrate that
child-centric, blanket, and revalidation approaches are not confined to one
region or community of nations with a common colonial history or
language.
From 2006 until 2010 we estimate at least twenty-four new laws or legal
code revisions were undertaken by sub-Saharan nations.153 Every part of
sub-Saharan Africa was swept up in the clamor for new law. Countries with
vastly different legal traditions and European colonial legal heritage—from
Djibouti to Kenya and Mozambique—found common cause in and common
pressure to pass anti-trafficking laws.154 By 2010, a supermajority of fortyfive sub-Saharan African nations had provided some capacity of antitrafficking statutory protection. While several new laws are still in the
pipeline, a considerable drop off in 2011 is assured by the simple fact that
most African nations appear to have now met minimum USDOS
requirements.155 Indeed, there is evidence emerging that a new stage is
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unfolding in the neo-abolitionist trend, namely the revision and/or
enhancement of new laws: Burkina Faso, South Africa, Mauritius, Nigeria,
and others have passed or announced, updated or expanded laws.156 Some,
such as Ghana, amended laws after finding them ineffective or
unenforceable.157
C. A Preliminary Taxonomy of Anti-Trafficking Laws in Sub-Saharan
Africa
By 2010, the overwhelming majority of sub-Saharan African nations
responded to the legislative challenge of the USDOS OMCTP. These
responses fall into one of four categories. In the first group, the blanket
human trafficking model, there exist laws such as that of Ghana,
Mozambique, and South Africa, which established a wide legislative tool to
encompass all forms of trafficking, including adults and organ theft. In the
second group, the child-centric model, laws such as those of Togo, Benin,
and Lesotho focus on children exclusively. In the third group, the
revalidation model, we place countries such as Angola, Botswana, and
Mali, which maintain they can combat trafficking through revisions of
existing criminal codes and/or enhancements of existing legislative
instruments. The fourth group comprises those nations who have taken no
action, or for which there is no data.
The following two data sets, Chart Two and Table One, demonstrate
respective placement in these four groups.
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Chart Two: Placement, by Group, of Sub-Saharan African Nations in a
Preliminary Taxonomy of Anti-Trafficking Legislative Responses
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Table One: Placement, by Country, of Sub-Saharan African Nations in
a Preliminary Taxonomy of Anti-Trafficking Legislative Responses
“Blanket” Human
Trafficking Model

“Child-centric”
Model

“Revalidation”
Model

No Change/ No Data

Burundi

Benin

Angola

Cape Verde

Burkina Faso

Cameroon

Comoros

Djibouti

Congo Republic

Botswana
Central African
Republic

Equatorial Guinea

DR Congo

Chad

Seychelles

Gambia

Ethiopia

Cote d’Ivoire

Somalia

Ghana

Gabon

Guinea-Bissau

Western Sahara

Kenya

Guinea

Eritrea

Zimbabwe

Liberia

Lesotho

(Northern) Sudan

n=7

Mauritius

Malawi

Mali

Mauritania

(Southern) Sudan

Niger

Mozambique

n=10

n=10

Sao Tome e Principe

Namibia
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa (draft)
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
n=21
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1. The “Blanket” Approach: Human Trafficking Laws
The first legislative model, the blanket approach, situates child trafficking
within wider clandestine networks of human trafficking. The laws in this
group, while addressing trafficking of both adults and children, frame the
role of parents in complex and, at times, conflicting ways. Ghana’s Human
Trafficking Act (Act 694) of 2005, Mozambique’s Lei No.6/2008, and
South Africa’s draft 2010 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in
Persons Bill (B7-2010) are representative of this group of legislation. Each
span several years of new human trafficking law in varied locales,
demonstrates legislative innovation and the expanding interests of
legislators, and addresses many regional concerns.
The blanket category currently holds the largest membership, and
continues to expand. The newest additions are South Africa and Kenya.
This approach – also embodied in laws from Nigeria (2003), Djibouti
(2007), and Mauritius (2009) – has produced some surprising results. On
the one hand, the blanket approach groups together all forms of
trafficking—child, adult, and other (e.g., organ theft)—for the purposes of
prosecutorial attention, and thus streamlines funding.158 On the other hand,
the lack of specific focus on children as trafficking subjects results in legal
inconsistencies. For example, Nigeria’s Child Rights Act (2003)
criminalizes child trafficking in only twenty of the thirty-six states where
the act is operative.159 Furthermore, states with blanket approaches devote
significant enforcement support to aspects of trafficking, such as
prostitution, that are unrepresented in the child victim pool. Such support is
developed in compliance with foreign governmental initiatives to repatriate
smuggled “illegal” migrants from, for example, the European Union and the
United States.160
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a. Ghana
The 2005 Ghana law elaborates a series of broadly applicable definitions
pertaining to trafficking, which incorporates the parental role. Initially,
human trafficking is defined as,
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, trading or
receipt of persons within and across national borders by (a) the use
of threats, force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or
deception, the abuse of power or exploitation of vulnerability, or
(b) giving or receiving payments and benefits to achieve
consent.161
Exploitation is further defined as including, “at the minimum, induced
prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery and practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs.”162 Trafficking is then framed to include “placement for sale,
bonded placement, placement as service where exploitation by someone
else is the motivating factor.”163 Finally, children are not mentioned until
Clause one, Section 4, which articulates that:
Where children are trafficked, the consent of the child, parents or
guardian of the child cannot be used as a defense in prosecution
under this Act, regardless of whether or not there is evidence of
abuse of power, fraud or deception on the part of the trafficker or
whether the vulnerability of the child was taken advantage of.
Thus, the actus reus undergirding the Ghanaian prohibition on trafficking
is constituted in multiple ways. This includes the specific criminalization of
all behavior iterated in Article One.164 Such individuals are subject to no
less than five years imprisonment.165
Whereas the definition of trafficking includes the issue of coercion by
parents, Clause 3, Section 1, restates the fact that simply being a parent of
the trafficked victim does not preclude prosecution: “A person who
provides another person for purposes of trafficking commits an offence
even where the person is a parent.”166 The law subsequently expands
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prosecutable parties to include accessories to trafficking, which are defined
as “intermediaries.”167 An intermediary is “someone who participates in or
is concerned with any aspect of trafficking” under the Act “who may or
may not be known to the family of the trafficked person.”168 The phrase “is
concerned” is expanded to include “to send, take to, consent to the taking to
or to receive at any place any person” and “to enter into an agreement
whether written or oral” that results in trafficking.169 Anyone “who uses” a
trafficking victim is subject to the same punishment.170 Moreover, the
Ghana Act tenders an extraterritorial jurisdiction to all acts that “would
have constituted the offence of trafficking.”171 Notwithstanding the defined
punishments, a judge is permitted to take special circumstances into
consideration when determining sentences, presumably including, for
example, a possible kinship relation between victim and perpetrator.172
Reporting mechanisms further transcend the child/parental divide. It is
the duty of all Ghanaians to “inform the police” of incidents of
trafficking.173 Reporting to police “or other security services” may take
place where the offender or victim lives, where the trafficking occurred, or
where the victim is temporarily located.174 Child victims of trafficking too
may report, with assistance from friends.175 Knowledge of trafficking may
also be passed on to a number of government agents and agencies, including
“reputable” NGOs.176 A further series of articles explains the processes
whereby trafficked persons are to be rescued, cared for temporarily,
counseled, and their families traced.177 The law specifically mandates that
“the views of the trafficked person shall be taken into consideration,” and
“rehabilitation” and related matters are all to be done “in the best interests
of the child.”178 A 2006 amendment to the 2005 Act corrected an error with
respect to the definition of exploitation that had rendered the original act
unenforceable.179
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b. Mozambique
Where Ghana featured a parent-child distinction in its act, Mozambique’s
law focuses on an inclusion of women. Mozambique’s Lei No.6/2008 is
entitled a comprehensive human trafficking act, and the language employed
embraces the Palermo Protocols’ emphasis on the vulnerability of women
and children. While the definition of the criminal act of trafficking (but not
the punishment to accompany it) in Article 10 conforms to some evolving
standards in international law, the act of trafficking is separated from the
conveyance and transportation of victims, which appears in Article 13.180
Article 2 of the law describes its objective as “the establishment of a
juridical regime applicable to the prevention and combating of trafficking in
persons, and in particular women and children.” Article 5 describes a series
of “aggravating circumstances” whereby additional penalties are incurred,
including but not limited to, trafficking actions affecting children, women,
and individuals under eighteen years of age. Additional aggravating
circumstances include the perpetrator being an educator, religious official,
or state or public official.
Further distinguishing it from Ghana’s law, Mozambique’s places
particular emphasis on the contexts whereby trafficking of and exploitation
of children may originate within the wider context of human trafficking. For
example, Article 12 outlaws the adoption of children when the outcome is
child prostitution, and Article 11 adds language about pornography and
sexual exploitation that does not feature in many human trafficking laws. It
also criminalizes a variety of issues pertinent to trafficking, but rarely
addressed in trafficking laws, including the seizure and destruction of travel
documents of victims by traffickers.181 Article 24 provides for the
permanent residency of trafficking victims who aid in the prosecution of
traffickers. Perhaps the most innovative element in the law is Article 15
concerning the “publicity and promotion of trafficking,” whereby anyone
disseminating materials or advertizing the trafficking of individuals by any
means, including “the internet” (incluindo o uso de tecnologia de
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informação e a internet [emphasis in original]), is subject to criminal
sanction and possible imprisonment. Trafficking actions by relatives of any
degree (por parente de qualquer grau na linha recta), blood relations, and
anyone entrusted with the role of guardian for a minor, are singled out for
particular attention.182 Article 8 makes reporting any trafficking actions the
responsibility of all citizens.

c. South Africa
South Africa’s draft bill describes trafficking and anti-trafficking action
with greater precision vis-à-vis the criminal justice system.183 We include a
draft because South Africa plays a prominent role in anti-trafficking, and
the content of the bill is still under scrutiny and subject to revision. The
definition of trafficking adopted is verbatim to that which appears in the
Palermo Protocols.184 In contrast with Ghana, South Africa’s law of 2010
specifically refers to the international obligations entered into when the
state became a signatory to the Palermo Protocols.185
With the likely imminent passage of the bill, South Africa will move
from a child-centric to a blanket approach. This shift is clearest with respect
to parental responsibility for trafficking of children in Chapter 9, Clause 34,
entitled, “Trafficking of child by parent, guardian or other person who has
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of child,” which discusses the
parental role clearly.
34. (1) If a children’s court has reason to believe that the parent or
guardian of a child or any other person who has parental
responsibilities and rights in respect of a child, has trafficked the
child, the court may—(a) suspend all the parental responsibilities
and rights of that parent, guardian or other person; and (b) place
that child in temporary safe care, pending an inquiry by a
children’s court. (2) Any action taken by a children’s court in
terms of subsection (1) does not exclude a person’s liability for
committing the offence of trafficking in persons . . . .186
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The law also contains an elucidation of the purpose of the clause, under
definitions. The purpose of clause 34 is explained as follows:
if a children’s court has reason to believe that a parent or guardian
of a child or any other person who has parental responsibilities and
rights in respect of a child has trafficked the child, the court may
suspend such rights and responsibilities and place the child in
temporary safe care, pending a children’s court inquiry. This,
however, does not exclude that person’s liability for committing
the offence of trafficking in persons.187
A 2008 magistrate’s decision suggests that until 2010, the law with
regard to parental responsibility was unclear.188 However, Clause 34 is
identical to Chapter 18, Clause 287 of the 2005 South African Children’s
Act, except insofar as the entire matter is from its initial prosecution the
remit of a Children’s Court.189
2. The Child-Centric Approach: Restricting Criminality to Acts
Perpetrated Against Minors
The second legislative model, a “child-centric” law, prevails in ten
nations, and the laws of Togo, Benin, and Lesotho are broadly emblematic,
because the laws either focus exclusively on child trafficking (Togo and
Benin) or implement domestic reforms required by international obligations
emanating from the ratification of the International Convention of the
Rights of the Child (Lesotho). As shown above in Chart Two and Table
One, Gabon and Cameroon are included in this group because their
prohibitions specifically on child trafficking and slavery, in 2004 and 2005
respectively, were complemented by the expansion of existing criminal
codes.190 This narrower approach delinks children from adult trafficking
networks with a variety of consequences. By 2010 each state in this second
child-centric group reported investigations and prosecutions, so there is
little ground to believe the laws were ineffective.
Our preliminary analysis of laws in this group suggests that this may
accurately be described as a transitional stage. The child-centric group
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currently is comprised primarily of francophone countries because many
anglophone and fewer francophone countries expanded their initial childcentric laws to encompass a blanket approach.191 For example, Gambia and
South Africa previously passed laws on children’s rights in 2005, which
enshrined the International Convention on the Rights of the Children into
domestic law, and included provisions prohibiting trafficking. Yet by way
of a 2007 law in Gambia and a 2010 draft bill in South Africa, the law
expanded to include all forms of human trafficking; and, at least in South
Africa’s draft law, the language employed was more or less identical to the
2005 text.

a. Togo
The 2005 Togo law “with respect to the traffic in children in Togo,” is
divided into five chapters covering generalities, definitions, prevention,
penalties, and miscellany.192 Perhaps, because the law is not concerned with
other forms of trafficking, the text is brief.193 The law is specifically defined
to address only trafficking in children, and the purpose of the law is
explained as “the definition, prevention and suppression of the trade in
children in Togo.”194
The law in Togo defines trafficking in children by focusing on the age of
the individual, the process of movement or displacement, and the type of
exploitation. Following emerging international standards, a child is defined
as one younger than eighteen years old.195 Trafficking in children is viewed
as “a serious infraction” which is defined “as the process whereby a child is
recruited or kidnapped, transported, transferred, housed or accommodated,”
within the interior of the country or externally to the national territory, “by
one or more people with the purpose of exploitation.”196 Exploitation in turn
is defined as “all activities which provide to the child no economic, moral,
mental or physical benefit but which by contrast, deliver to the trafficker or
other individuals, either directly or indirectly, economic, moral or physical
benefits.”197 The trafficker (auteur du trafic) is described as “any individual
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who performs at least one of the acts enumerated” in the previous article.198
A further provision elaborates a series of individuals who are considered
accomplices to the offences, including those who provide “information or
instructions”; those who procure “tools, weapons, transport or other means”
to support, aid, or abet traffickers; and, those who assist in the preparation,
facilitation or consumption of the criminal acts of trafficking.199
The 2005 law mandates both general and specific responsibilities for the
state with respect to the prevention of trafficking.200 The final article of the
section on protection lays out the mechanism whereby a child,
unaccompanied by parent(s) or guardian(s), may be permitted to leave the
country; it provides for a special authorization, the details of which are to be
elaborated by the Council of Ministers.201 The 2005 law also says that all
“measures adopted must guarantee the superior interests of the child and
respect his/her dignity.”202
The largest chapter of the law defines “sanctions” or punishments.
Traffickers and their accomplices, as well as those attempting to traffic, are
subject to prison sentences of between two and five years, and/or a fine
between one and five million francs, “regardless of the point of departure or
destination of the children.”203 A series of enhancements resulting in
imprisonment of five to ten years, and a fine of five million to ten million
francs, exist in certain circumstances, including:
1. If the child is below the age of fifteen at the time of the crime;
2. If the act committed is accompanied by violence;
3. If the trafficker uses drugs (stupéfiant) that affect the capacity of the
victim;
4. If the trafficker uses weapons or carries a conceal weapon;
5. If the victim is hidden or displayed in a public or private place;
6. If the act of trafficking causes the child physical, mental, or moral
damage or other repercussions requiring medical attention;
7. If the trafficking is part of an organized or group activity;
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8. If the child is subjected to the worst forms of labor;
9. In the event that the trafficker is a recidivist.204
Parents are subject to lesser punishments (six months to a year in prison
or probation up to three years) if they knowingly facilitate the trafficking of
their child or one under their guardianship.205

b. Benin
The 2006 Benin law, subtitled a law “with respect to the conditions
whereby children are moved, and for the suppression of the trade in
children,” has as its “object” the “determination of the conditions under
which children are moved and the elimination of the traffic in children”
within the republic.206 The law is divided into four chapters: generalities and
definitions, a description of the conditions under which children are
trafficked within Benin and beyond its borders, administrative and penal
disposition, and miscellany. The text of the first chapter precisely defines
what constitutes child trafficking by detailing several key factors present in
child trafficking. For example, it defines “children” as those under eighteen
years old.207 A “trafficker” is defined as an individual performing an act for
the purpose of alienating “the liberty or person of a child, whether
gratuitously or for personal financial gain.”208 Such acts of alienation may
include the recruitment, transportation, transfer, placement, or harboring of
children, “regardless of the ultimate particularities of the method of
exploitation.”209
The concept of “exploitation” in the 2006 Benin law is further elaborated
to include, but is not limited to:


all forms of slavery or analogous practices, debt bondage, and
servitude such as forced labor, the use of children in armed
conflict, or for the purposes of organ transplant;
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the offering up or procurement of a child for the purposes of
prostitution and the production of pornographic materials and
films;
the offering up or procurement of a child for the purpose of
criminal activities;
any work, which by its nature and/or conditions, may endanger
the health, security, or morality of a child or delivering a child
into any such circumstances.210

The concluding articles of the opening section state unequivocally that
child trafficking and all forms of child labor are illegal in Benin, except for
those permitted under international law.211
An important section of the law describes several contexts in which child
trafficking operates. This section includes: the types of acts whereby a child
would be considered trafficked within and outside the country, the forms of
movement of a child within the country, and the unauthorized separation of
a child from a biological parent (or a person with designated “authority”).212
This special authorization must be “delivered by the competent
administrative authority in the child’s place of residence.”213 The law also
states that no one is permitted to receive a child without assurance that such
an authorization exists.214 Further, anyone other than the biological parents
who receives a child must report the child’s arrival within seventy-two
hours, and is subject to penalties described in the same law. With the
exception of war and natural disaster, no foreign child may enter Benin
unless accompanied by a biological parent or a guardian. Additionally, the
child must be in possession of an identity document and documentation
about the destination and purpose of the voyage.215 Restrictions on the
movement of Beninese children beyond the limits of the republic are similar
to entry constraints. Any parent or guardian seeking to remove a child must
be in possession of a dossier consisting of the place of origin, the
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destination, the purpose of the movement, and the identity of the individuals
or establishment that will receive the child.216
Like Togo’s, Benin’s law also foregrounds prosecution and punishment.
Any child found in a situation that violates the terms laid out above (as a
result of the action—à l’insu—of parent of guardian) may be returned to his
or her parents or an institution of protection.217 Anyone found to be,
“moving, attempting to move, or accompanying,” a child without the
appropriate identifying documents, regardless of destination, is subject to
punishment if it can be “established that the child is a victim of trafficking
and the transporter took the child deliberately.”218 The law is exceptionally
tough on coercion by parents: mothers or fathers who knowingly relinquish
their child into the custody of a “trafficker” can face between six months
and five years imprisonment.219 Any individual involved in the domestic
movement or “attempted” movement of a child who has not followed the
protocols stipulated by the law faces between one and three years
imprisonment and a fine between 50,000 and 500,000 CFA.220 Similarly,
individuals, regardless of nationality, involved in removing a child from the
territory of the republic are subject to a sentence of two to five years and a
fine of 500,000 to 2,500,000 CFA.221 Furthermore, anyone failing to convey
knowledge of the trafficking of a child is also punishable by a fine.222 The
law makes a crucial distinction, however, between those who, “move or
attempt to move,” and those who “deliver into the trade” a child, whereby
the latter face between ten and twenty years imprisonment.223
Benin’s law then reiterates a series of circumstances that result in a
sentencing enhancement, often life behind bars.224 These circumstances
include that “if the child is not recovered prior to sentencing or is recovered
deceased”225 a sentencing enhancement will be added. Recidivism results in
the doubling of the punishments reiterated in articles 16–21.226 Additional
criminalized activities include knowingly “employing” a child who
originated in the trade, threats or use of force, “other forms of constraint,”
abduction, fraud, deception, and “abuse of authority.”227 Other acts
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constituting aggravation of child trafficking include: violence, deprivation,
incitement to debauchery or mendacity, public indecency, offering or
accepting payment or benefits, or consent to exploit a child.228 To
underscore the severity of the proscriptions, Articles 26 and 27 state: first,
“the attempt to commit any of the infractions previewed in the present law
is subject to the same punishment as if the crime were committed,” and,
second, “accomplices” will be punished in the same way as “authors” of the
criminal acts.229

c. Lesotho
Lesotho’s 2004 Children’s Protection and Welfare Bill is one of only
three anglophone laws currently falling within the “child-centric” category.
Until quite recently this was a more numerous group, but the cascade of
new laws and the pressure on nations to upgrade “child-centric” laws to
“blanket” approaches has diminished the group. The full title of Lesotho’s
2004 Act was a law, “to consolidate and reform the laws relating to the
protection and welfare of children and to provide for incidental matters.”230
While the law incorporates concrete language criminalizing child
trafficking, its stated objective is “to extend, promote and protect the rights
of children as defined in the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and
other international instruments, protocols, standards and rules on the
protection and welfare of children to which Lesotho is signatory.”231 The
definition of child trafficking is consistent with the Palermo Protocol as it
pertains to children.232
Uniquely, Lesotho’s child trafficking prohibition is preceded by a
prohibition on exploitative child labor.233 Lesotho’s law criminalizing child
trafficking is framed more generally than the laws of Togo and Benin,
insofar as Article 22(n) identifies as a responsibility of the state to “make
every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking, and abduction of children.” The
State’s responsibility notwithstanding, Lesotho describes child trafficking in
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much broader terms than that in any other child-centric law current or
superseded. Child trafficking is collapsed with child abduction, but the acts
and punishment referenced by the, “unlawful transfer of possession, custody
or control of child”234 are several:
1. Any person who takes part in any transaction the object or one
of the objects of which is to transfer or confer, wholly or partly,
temporarily or permanently, the possession, custody or control
of a child for any valuable consideration, commits an offence
and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not
less than twenty years;
2. Any person who without lawful authority or excuse harbours or
has in his/her possession, custody or control a child with respect
to whom the temporary or permanent possession, custody or
control has been transferred or conferred for valuable
consideration by any person within or outside Lesotho, commits
an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for
a term not less than twenty years;
3. For the purposes of subsection (2), if any person harbours or has
in his/her possession, custody or control a child without lawful
authority or excuse, the child shall, until the contrary is proved,
be presumed to be a child with respect to whom the temporary
or permanent possession, custody or control has been transferred
or conferred for valuable consideration.235
Though the above definition of trafficking includes the transference of
children, a subsequent Article provides a unique subcategory of crime—
namely “trafficking of child by false pretences.”236 Here, fraud, deceit, and
false pretense provide exacerbating circumstances and additional prison
time not present in other “child-centric” laws.237 The origin of this distinct
subcategory is unclear, but it appears to be derived from a set of
overlapping concerns originating with child abduction and extended to
include trafficking. Lesotho’s law is thus emblematic of the group of states
prohibiting child trafficking within the context of much broader child
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protection laws. Lesotho’s law attempts to regulate parental involvement in
child trafficking, but also provides for a defense.238
3. Revalidation
The third legislative model, one of “revalidation,” is predicated on the
idea that existing laws provide adequate infrastructure for a remedy. This
means that the relevant criminal codes, labor laws, or employment laws
need only be revised and updated to incorporate changing circumstances.
No one state’s laws are emblematic of this model because this group
consists of states that appear to contend that domestic laws adequately
provide for the prosecution of traffickers. The “revalidation” group of
nations is small and continues to diminish in membership. For example,
Côte d’Ivoire’s penal code imposes imprisonment and fines for the
following prohibited acts: forced labor,239 entering into contracts that deny
freedom to a third person,240 and recruiting or offering children for
prostitution.241 Additionally, the military code prohibits child
conscription,242 and Mali has similar, if not identical, articles of prohibition
in the 1973 revision of its criminal code.243
This “revalidation” group is small, and its membership is rapidly shifting
as the legislative trend is increasingly used across the continent. For
example, Rwanda uses existing penal and labor code statutes to prosecute
traffickers variously for slavery, forced labor, forced prostitution, and child
prostitution. However, a recent law has criminalized trafficking explicitly,
and upon implementation Rwanda will move to the “blanket” group.
Similarly, until December 2009 Kenya was previously a party, but with the
passage of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Bill of 2010, it too moved
into the “blanket” group. Until 2009, Malawi prosecuted traffickers through
its Employment Act and its Penal Code. But with the recent passage of its
Child Care, Protection and Justice Act, Malawi has moved into the “childcentric” category.
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The revalidation category contains states with complex political conflicts
and quixotic legislative tendencies, including countries torn apart by civil
war, all with backlogged and stalled anti-trafficking legislation. For
example, although Côte d’Ivoire has not passed a domestic anti-trafficking
law, it has entered into a bilateral child trafficking treaty with neighboring
Mali.244 Furthermore, the 2009 TIP report observed, “increased efforts to
address trafficking through . . . enforcement” of existing law, and noted that
legislation pending would, if passed by the national assembly and signed
into law, propel it out of the “revalidation group.”245
The revalidation group contains a number of states whose legislative
vehicles are either anchored in former colonial rule, or actually consist of
the vestiges of colonial law. But the fact that colonial laws feature
prominently and continue to be enforced underscores that this third
revalidation group is active with regard to anti-trafficking. For example,
Guinea Bissau currently only criminalizes forced labor under Article 37 of
its colonial Penal Code, but it recently began drafting a child trafficking
bill. This shows that these countries are not legislatively moribund or close
to failure. Instead, while each country in the third group reported
investigations and prosecutions to the USDOS, many states continue to
revise their statutes. Other countries, such as Niger, have recently
revitalized existing laws. For example, Niger’s penal code prohibits
procurement of a child for prostitution and slavery via a 2003 amendment,
and forced and compulsory labor through its Labor Code.246

IV. THE FUTURE OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT AND THE
NEO-ABOLITIONIST TREND
By 2010, the legislatures of the supermajority of African republics
promulgated new legislation to combat and outlaw trafficking in either
“humans” or “children.”247 These individual laws were the culmination of
years of research and lobbying by domestic and international antitrafficking constituencies, including children’s and women’s advocates,
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legislators and legal activists, and a decade-long campaign. These laws
focused on children, domestic violence, and women’s rights by
criminalizing specific practices associated with the illegal labor and
movement of individuals, and by penalizing noncompliance in a variety of
ways.248 The laws provide specific articles to discourage offenders and
inducements to incentivize compliance.
The process of drafting laws is consultative and deliberative and draws
on different sources within a nation and beyond for how to deal legislatively
with specific issues. While laws are the products of each individual nation,
the simultaneous introduction of anti-trafficking legislation in multiple
African national assemblies was not coincidental. Anti-trafficking laws
unfolded swiftly across Africa in the new millennium, but it would be far
too simplistic to interpret this development as yet another manifestation of
US imperialism. While the US Agency for International Development
(USAID) routinely sponsors legislative drafting training in Africa and
disseminates draft anti-trafficking statutes to national legislative drafters,
African nations drew on a rich history and a variety of sources for
inspiration.
Evidence for a stampede to new law is abundant, but it would be a gross
mischaracterization to see the avalanche of legislative remedies as without
precedent. When viewed from a distance, it is apparent that sub-Saharan
Africa is experiencing only the latest legislative trend in a series of
historical trends of abolition. An analysis of the contemporary neoabolitionist trend reveals three categories of legislative responses to
trafficking. By identifying the current trend as only the most recent iteration
of a long-standing tradition, predictions about the future of anti-trafficking
in the region can be made.
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A. Five Predictions About the Efficacy of the Current Neo-Abolitionist
Trend
First, although on the surface nations appear to be acting independently
and responding on a domestic basis to the challenges presented by
trafficking—and not by means of a continental coordinated effort—the
variation among the responses is minimal. Our analysis identifies only three
types of state responses to the perception that trafficking is a new and/or
growing problem. These three categories of legislative remedy are
identifiable by their respective definitions of trafficking and their stated
objectives. Members of the “blanket” group are attempting to ban all forms
of trafficking and deploy the most expansive definitions. The “childcentric” group is concerned exclusively with criminalizing child trafficking.
And the “revalidation” group appears to hold the view that there is no
legitimate basis for new law because existing law provides adequate
protection.
Second, notwithstanding the fact that state and nonstate actors repeatedly
reinforce the notion that trafficking is a new and growing problem, African
national responses to trafficking are remarkably consistent and predictable.
Where nations respond domestically with the passage of new laws, the
description of the problem and the imagined remedy are very similar. This
suggests the distinct possibility that although national legislatures take their
responsibility to address the issue seriously, they are simultaneously—
possibly unwittingly—acknowledging that a regional or transnational
response may be more appropriate, if not more effective.
Third, historical analysis of the legislative trend and our taxonomy of
anti-trafficking legislation together suggest that the volatility in the group
membership in the current neo-abolitionist trend is part of a larger historical
process. The fluidity between the three groups suggests that, just as all
participating nations eventually abolished the trans-Atlantic slave trade in
the nineteenth century, over time all African nations will adopt the
“blanket” approach.
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While it is beyond the scope of this article to explore precisely why any
particular nation may abandon its commitment to either a “child-centric” or
“revalidation” model, there is circumstantial evidence that suggests some
early laws were the product of hasty action. For example, with respect to the
blanket approach, almost immediately upon passage of the new human
trafficking law, both Ghana and Nigeria began drafting amendments.
Prosecutors complained that poorly written definitions did not provide the
leverage to guarantee convictions. For its part, the “child-centric” approach
is a highly transitory stage. As soon as prosecutors in Burkina Faso, South
Africa, and Gambia become familiar with the first law, the legislators
redefined trafficking to include adults. Similarly, the basis for the third
“revalidation” group underscores its inherent instability and mutability. It
comprises states with a Janus-faced legislative policy: they simultaneously
insist that their current domestic legal apparatus is satisfactory, while also
promulgating revisions of criminal codes, labor laws, and employment
laws, or entirely new, sweeping anti-trafficking laws.
Finally, we predict that the relative stability (or instability) of the three
taxonomies may be tied to how each grapples with a core problem present
in all states. There are a number of core or common issues, and by
exploring how different laws in each of the three taxonomies grapple with
the criminalization of the same core or common issues, the third prediction
above (that the blanket law is an inevitable outcome throughout Africa),
may be tested.
One such common issue is parental consent and coercion. In a subsequent
article we propose to examine specific legal provisions for parental consent
and coercion. Because the issue of parental involvement is central to
contemporary state and nonstate interest in child trafficking, an analysis of
the relative enforceability of specific statutes as they pertain to parental
consent and coercion will speak directly to the stability of the taxonomy
that is unfolding. If parental consent and coercion are adequately described
and the respective laws are enforceable, the three-part taxonomy will
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continue to exist. Alternatively, if the respective articles are found to be
weak and/or unenforceable, African nations will continue to promulgate
more expansive anti-trafficking legislation and thus further inform this
preliminary taxonomy.
B. Testing the Stability of the Preliminary Anti-Trafficking Taxonomy:
Parental Consent and Coercion
The centrality of parental consent and coercion in evolving legislative
responses to trafficking is becoming increasingly clear to legislators and
social justice activists alike.249 We have observed that it already features in
some new laws, including those of Ghana, South Africa, Benin, and
Lesotho. Because parental consent and coercion are common concerns
throughout sub-Saharan Africa, it may provide a clue to the stability of the
emerging taxonomy. The following victim interview is offered to illustrate
further research direction with regard to the core criminal issues in child
trafficking.
The April 2003 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, “Togo: Borderline
Slavery,” contained an unusual juxtaposition of interviews between a
trafficking victim and several anti-trafficking practitioners from Togo. Tenyear-old Kéméyao A. made the following statement:
There was a woman who came to the market to buy charcoal. She
found me and told my mother about a woman in Lomé who was
looking for a girl like me to stay with her and do domestic work.
She came to my mother, and my mother gave me away. The
woman gave my mother some money, but I don’t know how
much.250
Kéméyao identified a direct relationship of complicity between the
trafficking agent and her mother. However, among Togo’s anti-trafficking
activists, attitudes differ on how to address parental responsibility.251
Over the objections of the committee’s president, Judge Emanuel Edorh,
the drafting committee of Togo’s Children’s Code included expansive
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criminalization of parental roles in the draft legislation. Edorh told HRW
that while nearly everyone on the committee, including NGO members,
wanted to strongly penalize parents who contributed to the trafficking of
children, he disagreed:
[I]t does not further the rights of the child to violate human rights
[of parents] in this way. . . . If a father takes a risk with his child,
we know he’s committed an infraction and has to be punished. But
where I part with my fellow committee members is whether such a
parent should be imprisoned for six years. The punishment should
be six months to a year, not six years.252
Judge Edorh’s view was shared by Togo’s Minister of Women’s Affairs,
Suzanne Aho. She expressed concern about how the “punishment of parents
. . . might affect children.”253 She explained that “children are also
stigmatized when they have a parent in prison.”254
Although many Togolese anti-trafficking activists and NGOs supported
strong penalties for parents, HRW failed to support these goals and
endorsed only limited provisions on parental complicity. HRW couched its
position in the language of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child,
which states that the “best interests of the child” should guide
policymakers.255 HRW called for, “an explicit defense for parents who are
genuinely deceived about the purpose of their child’s recruitment, believing
it to be educational or otherwise non-exploitative.”256 HRW further
endorsed, “reduced penalties for parents who reasonably but mistakenly
believe that aiding and abetting child trafficking, or failing to report child
traffickers to the police, is in their child’s best interests.”257

V. CONCLUSION
As the preliminary nature of this analysis allows us only to lay the
groundwork for further study, we do not yet offer policy proposals to the
myriad of problems raised in this article. However, we suggest that certain
common difficulties faced by sub-Saharan nations grappling with domestic
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and cross-border trafficking can be ameliorated. This would require states to
expand data-gathering operations, increase capacity in internal
investigations and prosecutions, and institute regular region-wide agency
cooperation procedures.
A. Resolving Lack of Implementation
As in the case of Mauritania, numerous sub-Saharan nations have passed
anti-trafficking laws that have not been implemented. This defeats antitrafficking efforts, because the impetus to establish social change generally
dissipates after the passage because activists assume that the goal has been
reached. The laws thus serve to cap investigation of the very problem they
purport to solve.
Any solution to this lack of implementation would require increased datagathering on the incidence and nature of local forms of trafficking and on
the status of investigations and prosecutions under the law. Relevant
ministries should be directed to detail the steps taken to implement the
nation’s anti-trafficking law and should submit such reports at least
annually to the nation’s legislature to allow for longitudinal study of the
law’s effectiveness.
Effective implementation would also require the relevant ministries to
build a corps of investigators trained in interviewing victims and gathering
evidence and a similar corps of lawyers capable of presenting such evidence
to the courts. Because these prosecutions often require the development of
evidence less tangible than is the norm in more common crimes (such as
property, theft, or murder), professionalizing and training these officials
becomes imperative if anti-trafficking laws are to have any impact at all.
B. Resolving Lack of Cross-Border Cooperation
Increased data-gathering would further serve as a basic tool in building
connections between nations’ anti-trafficking agencies. As we have
observed above, the paucity of regional and cross-border information on
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trafficking hampers any rigorous analysis of these crimes. Also, the intracountry focus of existing data prevents standardization and open
communication between nations, creating obstacles to regional cooperation
in enforcement.
Beyond the removal of communication barriers, a solution to the lack of
cooperation between sub-Saharan nations requires the permanent institution
of data-sharing and the establishment of regular conferencing at the
investigative level. We note that many of the laws described herein require
interaction between nations at the ministerial level, perhaps to signify the
importance of the laws. However, the resulting intermittent high-level
meetings cannot fulfill the need for regular communication that is the
cornerstone of any cooperative effort.
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contemporary neo-abolitionists embrace macro trends and transnational analysis and
employ a discourse of “crisis” to amplify the “urgency” of action. Most importantly,
however, like the nineteenth-century abolitionists, today’s neo-abolitionists establish
close and effective relationships with media outlets. They prioritize the control of the
form and content of their message represents a striking departure from the broader child
labor advocacy of the 1980s and 1990s. For further discussion, see Benjamin N.
Lawrance, Documenting Child Slavery with Personal Testimony: The Origins of Anti-
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Trafficking NGOs and Contemporary Neo-Abolitionism, in TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN AFRICA, supra note 77.
125
The nations that have no new legislation pertaining to trafficking since 2001 or for
which no data is available are Cape Verde, Eritrea, Somalia, Seychelles, Sao Tome e
Principe, and Zimbabwe. See UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/humantrafficking/Gl
obal_Report_on_TIP.pdf.
126
This data includes all references to draft bills, tabled bills and laws, and revisions of
existing codes pertaining to trafficking or use in the enforcement of anti-trafficking
initiatives. In some instances countries may have drafted, tabled, or passed multiple bills
or laws and enacted multiple code revisions.
127
See generally US DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (1st ed. 2001);
2002 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 2; 2003 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT, supra note 56; 2004 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2005
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT, supra note 5; 2007 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2008
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT, supra note 3; 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21.
128
See CODE PÉNAL [PENAL CODE] (Côte d’Ivoire), available at http://www.protection
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/IVORY-COAST-FRENCH1.pdf.
129
Employment Act of 2000, § 4(1)–(2) (Act. No. 6/2000) (Malawi).
130
2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21 at 222 ( “Malawi prohibits all
forms of trafficking through various laws, including the Employment Act and Articles
135 through 147 and 257 through 269 of the Penal Code, though the country lacks
specific anti-trafficking laws.”).
131
The Labour Proclamation of Eritrea, (No. 118/2001), tit. I art. 3(17)(b) (Eritrea).
132
See id. at tit. III art. 9(6) (“An employer who engages in forced labour shall be
punishable under the Penal Code.”).”
133
2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 142.
134
2002 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 2, at 74.
135
République du Mali, Code pénal de la République du Mali (Art. 242 of 1973)
136
Id. at art 244.
137
2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 227.
138
Id. at 228 (“the Malian government decided to introduce a law criminalizing all forms
of trafficking in 2010.”).
139
Loi No. 38/2003 du 27 mai 2003 Portant Définition et repression du traffic d’enfant(s)
[Law No. 28/2003 of May 27, 2003 On the Definition and Suppression of Child
Trafficking] c. I, art. 2 (Burk. Faso), available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/BURKINA-FASO.pdf.
140
Id. at c. I, art. 3 (“Article 3: Est réputé trafic d’enfant(s) tout acte par lequel un enfant
est recruté, transporté, transféré, hébergé ou accueilli, à l’intérieur ou à l’extérieur du
territoire burkinabè par un ou plusieurs trafiquants au moyen de menaces et
d’intimidation par la force ou d’autres formes de contraintes, de détournements, de
fraudes ou supercheries, d’abus de pouvoir ou d’exploitation de la situation de
vulnérabilité d’un enfant ou dans le cas d’offre ou de réception de rémunération en vue
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d’obtenir le consentement d’une personne ayant pouvoir de contrôle sur lui à des fins
d’exploitation économique, sexuelle, d’adoption illicite, d’union matrimoniale précoce ou
forcée ou à toute autre fin préjudiciable à la santé, au développement physique, mental et
au bien-être de l’enfant.”)
141
See id. at c. II, art. 4.
142
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration Act Cap.
(24) § 50 (Nigeria). The Act defines key terms:
“Trafficking” includes all acts and attempted acts involved in the recruitment,
transportation within or across Nigerian borders, purchases, sale, transfer,
receipt or harbouring of a person involving the use of deception, coercion or
debt bondage for the purpose of placing or holding the person whether for or
not in involuntary servitude (domestic, sexual or reproductive) in force or
bonded labour, or in slavery-like conditions;
“Trafficked persons” means a victim of trafficking in persons; “Trafficker”
means a person or an entity that intends to commit, aids, abets or acquiesces to
an act of trafficking in persons. Id.
143

Id. at Art. 23.
See 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21, at 254 (“Niger prohibits
slavery through a 2003 amendment to Article 270 of its penal code and prohibits forced
and compulsory labor through Article 4 of its labor code. Penal code Articles 292 and
293 prohibit procurement of a child for prostitution, and Article 181 prohibits
encouraging child begging or profiting from child begging.”).
145
See Prevention of Organised Crime Act, (Act No. 29/2004) ch. 1 (Namib.), available
at http://www.parliament.gov.na/acts_documents/228_act_29_of_2004.pdfRepublic.
146
See id. (“‘trafficking in persons’ means the recruitment, transfer, harbouring or receipt
of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation and includes any attempt,
participation or organising of any of these actions. Exploitation includes, at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs . . . .”).
147
Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004 §2 (Lesotho), available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/afs/lesotho/les_ch_welfare_bill.htm.
148
Loi N° 009/2004 relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre le trafic des enfants en
République Gabonaise (rapport n° 13/2004 - Sénat) [Act No. 009/2004 on preventing
and fighting against child trafficking in Gabon (Report No. 13/2004 - Senate)].
149
See CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 597 (Eth.), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex
/docs/ELECTRONIC/70993/75092/F1429731028/ETH70993.pdf .
150
See 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5, at 47.
151
Anti-Human Trafficking Act (Act No. 7/2005) § 2(2) (Sierra Leone) (“A person
engages in the trafficking in persons if he undertakes the recruitment, transportation,
144
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transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other
forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation.).
152
Act to Ban Trafficking in Persons within the Republic of Liberia of 2005 §100,
available at http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Liberia_Actto-BanTIP_2005.pdf (“‘Trafficking In Persons’ shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a person by means of the threat or use of
force or other means of coercion, or by abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability, or by the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation.”).
153
See generally 2006 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2007
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 5; 2008 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT, supra note 5; 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3; 2010
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21.
154
See Loi 210/AN/07/5ème du 2 octobre 2007 relative à la Lutte Contre le Trafic des
Êtres Humains [Law 210/AN/-7/5 of Oct. 2, 2007 On Combating Trafficking in Human
Beings] (Djib.), available at http://www.presidence.dj/jo/2007/loi210an07.php; Lei No.
6/2008 de 9 de Julho 2008 [Law No. 6/2008 of July 9, 2008] (Mozam.); The CounterTrafficking in Persons Act (Act No. 52/2010) (Kenya)
155
See generally 2010 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 21.
156
See Loi No. 029-2008/AN du 15 mai 2000 du Portant Lutte Contre La Traite Des
Personnes Et Les Pratiques Assimilees; [Law No. 029-2008/AN of May 15, 2000 On the
Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices] (Burk. Faso), available at
http://www.protectionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/BURKINA-FASO.pdf;
Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No. 7/2010) (S. Afr.); The
Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act (Act No. 2/2009) (Mauritius), available at
https://www.oit.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents
/legaldocument/wcms_126787.pdf; Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law
Enforcement and Administration Act Cap. (24) § 50 (Nigeria). See also, 2009
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 226 (Nigeria’s “2003 Trafficking in
Persons Law Enforcement and Administration Act . . . was amended in 2005 to increase
penalties for traffickers.”).
157
See Human Trafficking (Amendment) Bill (GPC/A464/350/9/2007) (Ghana); DANISH
IMMIGRATION SERV., PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING IN GHANA 8 (2008),
available at http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/EB5BAEDA-0D96-46C2-B2D2E48BA8911B2C/0/Ghanaffrapport2008.pdf (“The Attorney-General’s Department
explained that during the passage of Act 694 the words ‘for the purpose of exploitation’
were mistakenly left out. The effect of this omission was that the definition of human
trafficking was not in accord with the internationally agreed definition of human
trafficking in the Palermo Protocol.”). See also Benjamin N. Lawrance, From Child
Labor “Problem”‘Problem’ to Human Trafficking “Crisis”‘Crisis’: Child Advocacy and
Anti-Trafficking Legislation in Ghana, 78 INT’L LAB. 63 (2010).
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158

For organ theft, see Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill
No. 7/2010) art. 3.1(a) (S. Afr.) and Human Trafficking (Amendment) Bill
(GPC/A464/350/9/2007) art. 1.2 (Ghana).
159
See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 226
160
Id. at 226–27.
161
Human Trafficking Act of 2005 (GPC/A464/350/9/2007), art.); Article 1(1)(a)–)(b)
(Ghana), available at http://www.mowacghana.net/download/Human%20Trafficking
%20Act.pdf.
162
Id. at art. (2).
163
See id. at art. 1(3).
164
See id. at art. 2(1).
165
See id. at art. 2(2).
166
Id. at art. 3(1).
167
Id. at art. 2.
168
Id. at art. 2(3).
169
Id. at art. 2(4).
170
Id. at art. 4.
171
Id. at art. 8 (“A person is liable to be tried and punished in Ghana for trafficking if the
person does an act which if done within the jurisdiction of the courts in this country
would have constituted the offence of trafficking.”).
172
Id. at art. 7 (“Special Mitigating Factors”).
173
Id. at art. 6(1)(a).
174
Id. at art. 9(1)(a)–(d).
175
See id. at art. 9(2)–(5).
176
Id. at art. 6(2)(b)(i)–(iv) (defining “Organisation” in Article 42).
177
Id. at art. 14–17.
178
Id. at art. 17(2); art.18(4).
179
See id. at art. 35; Human Trafficking (Amendment) Act of 2006 (Ghana).
180
See Lei No. 6/2008 de 9 de Julho 2008 de Tráfico de pessoas Artigo 10 [Law No.
6/2008 of July 9, 2008 de Trafficking in Persons art. 10] (Mozam.) (“Todo aquele que
recrutar, transportar, acolher, fornecer ou receber uma pessoa, pour quaisquer meios,
incluindo sob pretexto de emprego doméstico ou no estrangeiro ou formação ou
aprendizagem, para fins de prostituição, trabalho forcado, escravatura, servidão
involuntária ou servidão por dívida será punido….”). The definition of “trafficking in
persons” appears in the glossary annex. See id. at Anexo [Annex].
181
Id. at art. 16.
182
Id. at art. 5(b).
183
See Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No. 7/2010) (S.
Afr.). The full title of the draft bill is:
To give effect to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000; to
provide for an offence of trafficking in persons and other offences associated
with trafficking in persons; to prevent and combat the trafficking in persons
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within or across the borders of the Republic; to provide for measures to protect
and assist victims of trafficking in persons; to provide for the establishment of
the Intersectoral Committee on Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in
Persons; and to provide for matters connected therewith. Id.
184

Ghana’s law does not cite the Palermo Protocol. In contrast, South Africa’s draft bill
includes the full protocol in Schedule 2 and, under the Chapter 1 definitions. Id. at § 1(1),
sched. 2 (“‘UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons’ means
the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 60 Persons,
especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, the English text of which is replicated in Schedule
2.”).
185
Id. at pmbl. (“MINDFUL of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, and other
international instruments which place obligations on the Republic of South Africa
towards the combating and, ultimately, the eradication of trafficking in persons…”).
Ghana’s law contains no such preamble or reference to obligations.
186
Id. at § 34(1).
187
Id. at § 34(34).
188
See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
189
Compare see Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Bill, (Bill No.
7/2010) § 34 (S. Afr.) (“Trafficking of child by parent, guardian or other person who has
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of child”) and Children’s Act, (Act No. 38,
2005) cl. 287 (S. Afr.) (“[Clause] 287. If a court has reason to believe that the parent or
guardian of a child or any other person who has parental responsibilities and rights in
respect of a child, has trafficked the child or allowed the child to be trafficked, the court
may—(a) suspend all parental responsibilities and rights of that parent, guardian, or other
person; and (b) place that child in temporary safe care, pending an inquiry by a children’s
court.”) available at http://www.education.gov.za/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=XMF%2Fuq
Nr52U%3D&tabid=271&mid=1140.
190
See Loi N° 009/2004 relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre le trafic des enfants en
République Gabonaise (rapport n° 13/2004 - Sénat) [Act No. 009/2004 on preventing
and fighting against child trafficking in Gabon (Report No. 13/2004 - Senate)] (Gabon);
Relating to the Fight against Child Trafficking and Slavery (Law No. 015/2005)
(Cameroon). See also 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 97–98,
137–38); A 2006 Cameroonian draft bill on human trafficking has not been signed into
law. See 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 98.
191
See, e.g., Loi No. 38/2003 du 27 mai 2003 Portant Définition et repression du traffic
d’enfant(s) [Law No. 28/2003 of May 27, 2003 On the Definition and Suppression of
Child Trafficking] c. I, art. 2 (Burk. Faso) . This group also includes Southern Sudan, a
region soon to become independent, and already passing it own legislation.
192
Loi No.2005-009 Relative au Trafic D’enfants au Togo Chapîtres I–V [Law No. 200509 Relating to Child Trafficking in Togo ch. I–V] (Togo), available at
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http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/72058/72983/F1981134441/trafic%20enfant
s.pdf.
193
The full law comprises three printed pages, in contrast with, for example, Zambia’s
fifty-four page human trafficking law.
194
Loi No.2005-009 Relative au Trafic D’enfants au Togo Chapître I Article prémier
[Law No. 2005-09 Relating to Child Trafficking in Togo ch. I art. 1] (Togo).
195
Id. at ch. II art. 2.
196
Id. at ch. II art. 3.
197
Id. at ch. II art. 4.
198
Id. at ch. II art. 5.
199
Id. at ch. II art. 6.
200
See id. at ch. III art. 7 (“L’Etat et les collectivités locales prennent toutes les mésures
appropriées en vue d’assurer la protection de tous les enfants contre le trafic et toute
forme d’exploitation.”).
201
Id. at ch. III art. 9
202
Id.
203
Id. at ch. III art. 10.
204
Id. at ch. III art. 11.
205
See id. at ch. III. art. 12.
206
Loi No.2006-04 Du 10 AVRIL 2006, Chapter 1, Article 1. It builds on a 1961 law
concerning the movement on minors outside the nation and a 1973 modification of the
criminal code with respect to the slavery and the abduction of minors. Loi No.61-20 du
05 Juillet 1961 (République du Dahomey); Ordonnance No.73-37 du 13 Avril 1973. It
builds on a 1961 law concerning the movement on minors outside the nation and a 1973
modification of the criminal code with respect to the slavery and the abduction of minors.
207
See Loi No. 2006-04 Du 05 Avril 2006 de Portant conditions de deplacement des
mineurs et repression de la traite d’ enfants en republique de benin, Chapître Premier
Article 2 [Law No. 2006-04 of Apr. 5, 2006 on the Condition of Juvenile Movement and
Repression of Child Trafficking in the Republic of Benin ch. I art. 2] (Benin).
208
Id. at ch. I art. 2.
209
Id. at ch. I art. 3.
210
Id. at ch. I art. 4.
211
See id. at ch. 1 art. 5–6.
212
Id. at ch. I art. 7.
213
Id. at ch. 1 art. 7.
214
The mode of acquisition of such authorization is to be elaborated by decree by the
Council of Ministers.
215
The law is unclear as to who should be in possession of the documents—the child, the
parent, the guardian, or all of the above. See Loi No. 2006-04 Du 05 Avril 2006 de
Portant conditions de deplacement des mineurs et repression de la traite d’ enfants en
republique de benin, Chapître II Article 9 [Law No. 2006-04 of Apr. 5, 2006 on the
Condition of Juvenile Movement and Repression of Child Trafficking in the Republic of
Benin ch. III art. 16] (Benin). Moreover, in the paramount interests of the child, any
appropriate government or judicial authority may refuse entry to foreign children if the
conditions of articles nine and ten are not met. Id. at ch. II art. 11.
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See id. at ch. II art. 12.
See id. at ch. III art. 14.
218
Id. at ch. III art. 15, 18.
219
Id. at ch. III art. 16.
220
Id. at ch. III art. 17.
221
See id. at ch. III art. 18–19.
222
See id. at ch. III art. 20.
223
Id. at ch. III art. 21.
224
See id. at ch. III art. 21.
225
Id. at ch. III art. 21.
226
See id. at ch. III art. 25.
227
Id.at ch. III art. 22.
228
Id. at ch. III art. 23–24.
229
Id. at ch. III art. 26–27.
230
Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004 (Lesotho), available at http://www.law.ya
le.edu/rcw/rcw/jurisdictions/afs/lesotho/les_ch_welfare_bill.htm.
231
Kingdom of Lesotho, Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004, Article 1.
232
See id. at art. 2 (“‘trafficking’ means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, sale,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation.”).
233
See id. at art. 14 (“A child has a right to be protected from exploitative labour as
provided for under section 233 of this Act and other international instruments on child
labour.”).
234
Id. at pt. VIII.
235
Kingdom of Lesotho, Children’s Protection and Welfare Act 2004, Article 70.
236
Id. at art. 71.
237
Id.
238
See id. at art. 74. Article 74 provides:
3. It shall be a defence under this section if a person takes or sends a child away
without the consent of the person having lawful custody of the child if—
a. the person—
i. does it in the believe that the other person consented, or
would have consented, if he/she was aware of all the
relevant circumstances; or
ii. has taken all reasonable steps to communicate with the
other person but has been unable to communicate with
him/her;
b. the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the child has been
abused, neglected, abandoned or exposed in a manner likely to
cause a child physical, psychological or emotional injury; or
c. the other person has unreasonably refused to consent although
he/she was aware of all the relevant circumstances.
217
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239

Côte d’Ivoire, Code Pénal, 31 août 1981: Article 378.
See id. at art. 376 (“Est puni d’un emprisonnement de cinq à dix ans et d’une amende
de 500.000 à 5.000.000 de francs, quiconque conclut une convention ayant pour objet
d’aliéner, soit à titre gratuit, soit à titre onéreux, la liberté d’une tierce personne. Le
maximum de la peine est toujours prononcé si la personne ayant fait l’objet de la
convention est âgée de moins de quinze ans.”).
241
See id. at art. 335–37.
242
Côte d’Ivoire, Code de la fonction militaire, Art. 2.
243
The Criminal Code of prohibits and punishes with imprisonment all forms of child
trafficking (Art. 244), the sexual exploitation of children and forced prostitution of adult
women (Art. 229) and the entering into agreements or contracts that deprive third parties
of their liberty (Art. 242). See CODE PÉNAL [PENAL CODE] art. 244, 229, 242 (Côte
d’Ivoire).
244
See Agreement Concerning the Fight Against the Trafficking of Children between
Borders, Cote D’Ivoire-Mali, Sept. 2000.
245
2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 114.
246
CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 292–293, 270 (Niger); CODE DU TRAVAIL [LABOR C.], art,
Art. 4 (Niger).
247
2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 3, at 51.
248
For an appraisal of Ghana’s Child Rights Act, see Siobhan Laird, The 1998 Children’s
Act: Problems of Enforcement in Ghana, 32 BRITISH J. SOC. WORK 893 (2002).
249
See Michael J. Dennis, Newly Adopted Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 789, 790–91 (2000).
250
JONATHAN COHEN, BORDERLINE SLAVERY: CHILD TRAFFICKING IN TOGO 23 (Joanne
Csete et al. eds., 2003).
251
See Amy R. Ritualo et al., Measuring Child Labor: Implications for Policy and
Program Design 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 401 (2003).
252
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW), TOGO: BORDERLINE SLAVERY: CHILD TRAFFICKING
IN TOGO 39–40 (2003).
253
COHEN, supra note 250, at 40.
254
Id.
255
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 9, §1, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(providing that “a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will,
except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance
with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests
of the child”); see also id. at art. 3, §1 (obliging states to make the best interests of the
child a “primary consideration” in “all actions concerning children”).255
256
COHEN, supra note 250, at 48.
257
Id.
240
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